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ROBIN HOOD WAS RIGHT, OR, NEVER TRUST A
SHERIFF: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
SHERIFFS' SALES AND THE
MARYLAND RECORDING ACT
ALICE A. SOLED*
It all too frequently happens that the same tract of land is
transferred to successive transferees by the same transferor. This
most commonly occurs in the context of successive transfers by the
same individual. It also occurs, however, when the successive
transfers are made by a public official, such as a sheriff, on behalf of
the same individual, or when one transfer is made by an individual
and another is made by a public official on his behalf. The resolution
of the dilemma posed by this situation long has been a fertile source
of controversy.
At common law, the first transferee usually was preferred over
all subsequent transferees of the same land from the same
transferor, even when the subsequent transferees were bona fide
purchasers for value and without notice of the first transfer.1 The
common law priority of the first transferee was justified on the
theory that, after the transferor made the first transfer, he had
nothing left to convey to any subsequent transferee. 2 The only
noteworthy exception to this rule gave priority to a subsequent
transferee when the interest in land received by the first transferee
was purely equitable, and the subsequent transferee acquired a legal
interest in the same land from the same transferor for value and
without notice of the prior equitable interest.A
A.B. 1953, J.D. 1955, University of Michigan. Professor of Law, University of
Maryland School of Law.
1. 5 H. TIFFANY, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY §§ 1257, 1258, 1260 (3d ed. 1939);
Aigler, The Operation of the Recording Acts, 22 MIcH. L. REv. 405, 405-06 (1924); e.g.,
Fallass v. Pierce, 30 Wis. 443, 473 (1872) (dictum).
2. 5 H. TIFFANY, supra note 1, §§ 1257, 1258, 1260; Aigler, supra note 1, at 405-06;
e.g., Hallett v. Alexander, 50 Colo. 37, 48-50, 114 P. 490, 495 (1911) (dictum); McClure
v. Tallman, 30 Iowa 515, 520 (1870) (dictum); see, e.g., Boynton v. Haggart, 120 F. 819,
823-24 (8th Cir.) (dictum), cert. denied, 191 U.S. 573 (1903); Memphis Land & Timber
Co. v. Ford, 58 F. 452, 455-56 (8th Cir. 1893) (dictum); Burns v. Berry, 42 Mich. 176,
178-79, 3 N.W. 924, 925 (1879) (dictum); Messersmith v. Smith, 60 N.W.2d 276, 282
(N.D. 1953); Zimmer v. Sundell, 237 Wis. 270, 274, 296 N.W. 589, 591 (1941) (dictum);
Fallass v. Pierce, 30 Wis. 443, 473 (1872) (dictum).
3. 5 H. TIFFANY, supra note 1, § 1261; Aigler, supra note 1, at 406. This ex-
ception has been extended to deny priority to a transferee of a purely equitable
interest in land as against a subsequent transferee of a purely equitable interest in the
same land from the same transferor who took his equitable interest for value and
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Today, in every one of the United States, the common law rule
has been changed by a recording act that denies priority to a
transferee of an interest in land as against a subsequent transferee
of an interest in the same land from the same transferor if the prior
transferee fails to comply with the requirements of the recording
act.4 Every recording act is either a "notice" statute, a "race" statute,
or a "notice-race" statute.5 Each establishes different criteria for
denying priority to the first transferee of an interest in land.
Under a "notice" statute, a transferee of an interest in land,
whose conveyance is of a type entitled to be recorded,6 is denied
priority as against a subsequent transferee of an interest in the same
land from the same transferor 7 if the subsequent transferee acquires
his interest for value and without notice of the prior transfer before
the prior transferee records.8 Under a "race" statute, a transferee of
an interest in land is denied priority as against a subsequent
transferee if the subsequent transferee records his transfer before the
prior transferee records.9 This is true even if the subsequent
transferee is not a bona fide purchaser for value and without notice
of the prior transfer.10 Finally, under a "notice-race" statute, such as
that in effect in Maryland,1 a transferee of an interest in land,
whose conveyance is of a type entitled to be recorded, is denied
priority as against a subsequent transferee only if the subsequent
transferee both is a bona fide purchaser for value without notice of
without notice of the prior equitable interest and thereafter acquired the legal title to
such land without notice of the prior equitable interest. E.g., Fitzsimmons v. Ogden,
11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 2 (1819); United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 131 F. 668
(8th Cir. 1904) (indicating that subsequent transferee of equitable interest is preferred
even though legal title acquired after notice of the defect), aff'd, 200 U.S. 321 (1906);
Oviatt v. Brown, 14 Ohio 285 (1873); see Bayley v. Greenleaf, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 46
(1822).
4. See 4 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 17.5 (A. Casner ed. 1952).
5. Id.
6. Not all types of conveyances of interests in land are entitled to be recorded. If
it is not of a type entitled to recordation, a conveyance is not subject to the priority
provisions of the recording acts. 4 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY, supra note 4, § 17.8.
7. Throughout this article, the phrase "subsequent transferee" shall mean
"subsequent transferee of an interest in the same land from the same transferor,"
except when a different meaning is indicated expressly or is necessarily inferrable
from the context.
8. 4 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY, supra note 4, § 17.5.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. §3-203 (1974). The author is aware that the
proper reference to this statute, mandated by the Maryland Legislature, is to the
"Real Property Article." However, Uniform System of Citation (otherwise known as
"the Blue Book") mandates the form in which this statute is cited throughout this
article.
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the prior transfer and records his transfer before the prior transferee
records.
12
In light of the above-described statutory changes in the common
law priorities, it is noteworthy that, in Lewis v. Rippons,13 the Court
of Appeals of Maryland pronounced, albeit as dictum, that as
between two successive purchasers of the same land from the same
sheriff on execution sale, the first purchaser would have priority
even if the second purchaser were a bona fide purchaser for value,
without notice of the prior transfer, who recorded his deed from the
sheriff before the prior transferee recorded. This article will
demonstrate that this dictum, which is diametrically opposed to the
expected result under a notice-race statute such as that in effect in
Maryland, is based upon a misconception and misapplication of
prior Maryland law.
Rippons involved an execution sale on March 13, 1968, of two
parcels of land, known as "Tract 2" and "Tract 3," which were
owned by the same judgment debtor and which had been seized by
the Sheriff of Dorchester County pursuant to a writ of fieri facias.14
Although these two tracts were in fact distinct parcels of land, the
description of "Tract 3," as it appeared in the deed conveying it to
the judgment debtor, included within the boundaries of "Tract 3" the
land known as "Tract 2." Furthermore, this deed to "Tract 3" made
specific reference to this inclusion. The "Tracts" were sold in
numerical order: 15 "Tract 2" was sold to Mr. Rippons and "Tract 3"
- the description of which included "Tract 2" - was then sold to
Mr. and Mrs. Harding. Both Mr. Harding and Mr. Lewis, who later
purchased "Tract 3" from Mr. Harding, were present when "Tract 2"
was sold to Mr. Rippons and both were aware of this sale. The
purchase price for each of the parcels was paid to the sheriff on the
day of the sale. On April 3, 1968, the sheriff conveyed "Tract 3" to
12. 4 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 4, § 17.5; e.g., Busey v. Reese, 38
Md. 264 (1873); United States Ins. Co. v. Shriver, 3 Md. Ch. 381 (1851), aff'd sub nom.
General Ins. Co. v. United States Ins. Co., 10 Md. 517 (1857); see, e.g., Fertitta v. Bay
Shore Dev. Corp., 252 Md. 393, 250 A.2d 69 (1969); Grayson v. Buffington, 233 Md. 340,
196 A.2d 893 (1964); Tyler v. Abergh, 65 Md. 18, 3 A. 904 (1886); Gill v. Griffith, 2 Md.
Ch. 270 (1848).
13. 282 Md. 155, 383 A.2d 676 (1978).
14. A writ of fieri facias is a common law writ that commands the sheriff to seize
and sell the property of a judgment debtor to satisfy the judgment debt.
15. Although the order in which the-"Tracts" were sold was disputed both at the
trial and on appeal, the trial judge found as a fact that the "Tracts" were sold in
numerical order and the Court of Appeals affirmed, stating that "the chancellor's
determination as to the order of sale was not clearly erroneous." 282 Md. at 160, 383
A.2d at 679-80.
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the Hardings by a deed that contained the same metes and bounds
description as that contained in the deed of "Tract 3" to the
judgment debtor, but which otherwise made no reference to the
inclusion of "Tract 2" within the boundaries of "Tract 3." The
Harding deed was duly recorded. Thereafter, on December 22, 1972,
the Hardings conveyed "Tract 3" to Mr. and Mrs. Lewis by a deed
that contained the same description of "Tract 3" as that contained in
the sheriff's deed of "Tract 3" to the Hardings. On May 3, 1973, the
sheriff finally conveyed "Tract 2" to Mr. Rippons by a deed that was
duly recorded.
In 1976, Mr. Rippons brought a proceeding to quiet title to "Tract
2." The Circuit Court of Dorchester County decreed Mr. Rippons to
be the absolute owner of that tract. The Court of Appeals granted
certiorari prior to consideration of the Lewis' appeal by the Court of
Special Appeals and, without dissent, affirmed the circuit court. The
Court of Appeals held that Mr. and Mrs. Lewis were not entitled to
"Tract 2" by operation of the notice-race priorities provisions of the
recording act, 16 despite the fact that their predecessors' deed to
"Tract 3," which included "Tract 2," was recorded before the
recording of the sheriffs deed of "Tract 2" to Mr. Rippons. The
court's holding was based on its conclusion that, because he was
aware of the sale of "Tract 2" to Mr. Rippons, Mr. Lewis was not a
bona fide purchaser for value and without notice.17
After enunciating its holding, which clearly was correct on the
facts,' 8 the Rippons court proceeded to state an alternative ground
16. MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 3-203 (1974). Language similar to that of
§ 3-203 was in effect in 1968 when the sale in Rippons occurred. See MD. ANN. CODE
art. 21, § 13 (1957). This statute remained in effect until it was repealed and reenacted,
with one noteworthy change, as MD. ANN. CODE art. 21, § 3-203 (Cum. Supp. 1972).
The language of the 1972 legislation is almost identical to that of the present statute.
For a discussion of the above-mentioned change, see notes 103 to 107 and
accompanying text infra.
17. 282 Md. at 162, 383 A.2d at 680.
18. On the facts as given, neither Harding, who purchased "Tract 3" at the
sheriff's sale, nor Lewis, who purchased "Tract 3" from Harding, was a bona fide
purchaser for value and without notice, because both were present at the sale when
"Tract 2" was sold to Rippons. Consequently, neither was entitled to the benefit of the
applicable version of the "notice-race" priorities provisions of MD. REAL PROP. CODE
ANN. § 3-203 (1974). See, e.g., Fertitta v. Bay Shore Dev. Corp., 252 Md. 393, 250 A.2d
69 (1969); Grayson v. Buffington, 233 Md. 340,196 A.2d 893 (1964); Tyler v. Abergh, 65
Md. 18, 3 A. 904 (1886); Busey v. Reese, 38 Md. 264 (1873); United States Ins. Co. v.
Shriver, 3 Md. Ch. 381 (1851), aff'd sub nom. General Ins. Co. v. United States Ins.
Co., 10 Md. 517 (1857); Gill v. Griffith, 2 Md. Ch. 270 (1848). It is disturbing to note,
however, that the court made no reference to Harding's bona fides or lack thereof; it
was concerned solely with Lewis' lack of bona fides. It is true that it generally is held
that a person in Lewis' position is protected under a notice-race recording statute if he
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for its decision. The court asserted that because title to "Tract 2"
passed to Rippons, the first purchaser, by operation of law upon its
sale to him by the sheriff, a deed from the sheriff was not necessary
to vest legal title in him.' 9 According to the court, "Tract 2" therefore
could not have been sold by the sheriff to Harding, the second
purchaser.2° Implicit in the alternative ground for its decision is the
court's belief that no subsequent purchaser would have been entitled
to "Tract 2" by operation of the notice-race priorities provisions of
the recording act even if he had been a bona fide purchaser for value
and without notice. According to the court, because
title to these tracts passed to the purchasers upon the sale of
them by the Sheriff. . . .the subsequent deeds had no effect
upon that title other than to confirm it. Therefore which deed
was executed and recorded first is irrelevant to the decision in
this case.
...[G]iven the finding of the chancellor that Tract 2 was
sold first, it follows that upon its sale title vested in Rippons,
and that the land described as Tract 2 could not have been sold
by the Sheriff at the same sale as a part of Tract 3.21
This conclusion is the reverse of that to be expected from a
standard application of the priorities provisions of the recording
acts. For, the effect of these provisions, where applicable, is to give
title to the second purchaser of the same land from a common
grantor if the second purchaser is a bona fide purchaser for value
and without notice who records first, even though the grantor "had
nothing left to sell" after his transfer to the first purchaser.22 Thus,
by implying that the second purchaser's priority of record would not
have entitled him to ownership of "Tract 2" even if he had been a
is a bona fide purchaser for value and without notice, even if his predecessor in title is
not. 4 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 4, § 17.11, at 567. It is also generally
held, however, that a person in Lewis' position is protected under a notice-race statute,
even though he is not a bona fide purchaser for value, if his predecessor in title took
such title for value and without notice. Id. at 567-68.
19. Throughout this article, use of the phrase "title passed to the purchaser by
operation of law upon its sale to him by the sheriff' or a similar phrase carries with it
as a corollary by implication the concept that a deed from the sheriff is not necessary
to vest legal title in the purchaser.
20. 282 Md. 155, 162-66, 383 A.2d 676, 680-82 (1978).
21. Id. at 162, 166, 383 A.2d at 680-81, 682 (emphasis supplied) (footnote omitted).
In the footnote to the italicized sentence quoted above, the court emphasized its point
by stating: "We take cognizance of Code (1974), § 14-103(a) Real Property Article,
which has no bearing on this case." Id. at 162 n.2, 383 A.2d at 681 n.2.
22. See notes 95 & 96 and accompanying text infra.
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bona fide purchaser for value and without notice, the court
necessarily implied that sheriffs' sales are not subject to the
priorities provisions of the recording acts under any circumstances.
The reasoning of the court which gives rise to the implication
that sheriffs' sales are not subject to the priorities provisions of the
recording acts under any circumstances appears to have been based
on one or more of the following actual or possible misconceptions.
The first misconception under which the court labored was a
misapplication of the -oft-repeated "rule" that the legal title to
Maryland realty sold by a sheriff on execution sale passes to the
purchaser thereof by operation of law upon the sale, so that a deed
from the sheriff is not necessary to vest legal title in the purchaser.23
This misconception resulted in an erroneous conclusion that the
recording of a deed from the sheriff is not essential to the passage of
legal title to the property sold by him. This conclusion in turn served
as the basis for a second misconception, an erroneous assumption.
that the recording of a "deed" has no role in the establishment of
priorities under the recording acts if the recording of such "deed" is
not essential to the validity of a transfer of the legal title to the
property. 24 In fact, even if the court was correct in its view that the
recording of a deed from the sheriff is not essential to a valid
transfer of title by him, this assumption ignored two essential
distinctions: first, the distinction between the role of recording in
validating a transfer of legal title and the role of recording in
determining priorities,25 and second, the distinction, insofar as the
role of recording in the establishment of priorities is concerned,
between the situation in which a "deed" is not entitled to be
recorded, 26 and that in which a "deed" may, but need not, be
recorded. 27 Although not expressed in Rippons, it is possible that the
court's opinion was influenced by a third and final misconception:
that a purchaser at a sheriffs sale always and necessarily takes
subject to prior unrecorded equities. If present, this misconception
possibly results from a confusion between the situation in Rippons,
which involved a controversy between two transferees of the same
23. The court stated and applied this "rule" in Rippons. See 282 Md. at 162-66,
383 A.2d at 680-82. The "rule" and its application by the court are analyzed at notes
51 to 77 and accompanying text infra.
24. See id. at 162-66, 383 A.2d at 680-82.
25. See notes 79 to 123 and accompanying text infra.
26. In this case its recording has no effect on priorities. See note 123 and
accompanying text infra.
27. See notes 97 to 102 and accompanying text infra.
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land from the same sheriff on execution sale, and the situation in
which the controversy is between a transferee of land from a
judgment debtor and a purchaser of the same land from a sheriff at
an execution sale.28
PASSAGE OF LEGAL TITLE TO LAND SOLD
AT A SHERIFF'S SALE
Courts frequently have enunciated the "rule" that the legal title
to Maryland realty sold by a sheriff on execution sale passes eo
instanti to the purchaser by operation of law without any need for a
deed or other instrument in writing.29 Despite the many assertions of
this "rule," a recorded (or recordable) muniment of title always has
been considered essential to the passage of a nonvoidable title to
Maryland realty when it is sold at a sheriffs sale3° because such a
sale is within the Statute of Frauds31 and the rationale and policy of
the recording acts.32 It further would appear, in fact, that, at the
present time, a deed from the sheriff is essential to the passage of
legal title to land at a sheriffs sale, in which case the deed clearly
would be subject to the priorities provisions of the recording acts.33
In Maryland, statutory law provides that, as a general rule, "no
estate of inheritance or freehold, declaration or limitation of use,
estate above seven years, or deed may pass or take effect unless the
deed granting it is executed and recorded. ' 34 This language, or
language substantially identical to it, has been part of Maryland's
28. See notes 138 to 183 and accompanying text infra.
29. E.g., Remington v. Linthicum, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 84 (1840); Van Ness v. Hyatt,
28 F. Cas. 1044 (C.C.D.C. 1837) (No. 16,867), aff'd, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 294 (1839); Lewis v.
Rippons, 282 Md. 155, 383 A.2d 676 (1978); Preissman v. Crockett, 194 Md. 51, 69 A.2d
797 (1949); Dorsey's Lessee v. Dorsey, 28 Md. 388 (1868) (dictum); Stump v. Henry, 6
Md. 201, 61 Am. Dec. 300 (1854); Alexander v. Walter, 8 Gill 239, 50 Am. Dec. 688 (Md.
1849) (dictum); Tomlinson's Lessee v. Devore, 1 Gill 345 (Md. 1843); Balch v.
Zentmeyer, 11 G. & J. 267 (Md. 1840); Estep and Hall's Lessee v. Weems, 6 G. & J. 303
(Md. 1834); Barney v. Patterson's Lessee, 6 H. & J. 182 (Md. 1823); Boring's Lessee v.
Lemmon, 5 H. & J. 223 (Md. 1821); Duvall v. Waters, 1 Bland 569, 18 Am. Dec. 350
(Md. Ch. 1827). But see Wheaton v. Sexton's Lessee, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 503 (1819) (title
passes by sale, return and deed); Bull's Lessee v. Sheredine, 1 H. & J. 410 (Md. Gen.
Ct. 1803) (same).
30. See notes 53 to 66 and accompanying text infra.
31. See notes 53 to 55 and accompanying text infra.
32. See notes 58 & 59 and accompanying text infra.
33. See notes 67 to 77 and accompanying text infra.
34. MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. §3-101(a) (1974).
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statutory law since 1766, 35 and it has been construed consistently to
mean that the legal title to land can be validly transferred only by a
duly executed and recorded deed 36 or by operation of law.37 Neither a
duly executed but unrecorded deed,38 nor a deed which is defectively
executed and therefore not entitled to be recorded, 39 is effective to
pass the legal title to the land purportedly conveyed by it. Such a
deed, however, has been held to be effective between the parties to
the conveyance 40and against those with notice thereof,41 at least if it
was made for a consideration. 42 These holdings apparently are based
on the theory that such a deed operates as a contract to convey, 43
35. United States v. Gallas, 269 F. Supp. 141, 148-49 (D. Md. 1967). The first
broadly inclusive recording act in Maryland was passed in 1766. See ch. 14, 1766 Md.
Laws 110. This statute, with language essentially the same as that in the present
statute, later was codified as MD. ANN. CODE art. 21, § 1 (1957), and MD. ANN. CODE
art. 21, § 3-101(a) (Cum. Supp. 1972).
36. E.g., Greenleafs Lessee v. Birth, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 302 (1832); Bourke v. Krick,
304 F.2d 501 (4th Cir. 1962); Kingsley v. Makay, 253 Md. 24, 251 A.2d 585 (1969)
(dictum); Berman v. Berman, 193 Md. 614, 69 A.2d 271 (1949); West v. Pusey, 113 Md.
569, 77 A. 973 (1910); Nickel v. Brown, 75 Md. 172, 23 A. 736 (1892); Baltimore &
H.R.R. v. Algire, 65 Md. 337, 4 A. 293 (1886); Johns v. Reardon, 3 Md. Ch. 57 (1852),
aff'd sub nom. Johns v. Scott, 5 Md. 81 (1853) (deed recorded, but not entitled to be
recorded since defectively executed).
37. E.g., Kingsley v. Makay, 253 Md. 24, 251 A.2d 585 (1969) (dictum); see Lewis v.
Rippons, 282 Md. 155, 383 A.2d 676 (1978).
38. West v. Pusey, 113 Md. 569, 77 A. 973 (1910); see, e.g., Greenleafs Lessee v.
Birth, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 302 (1832); Bourke v. Krick, 304 F.2d 501 (4th Cir. 1962);
Kingsley v. Makay, 253 Md. 24, 251 A.2d 585 (1969) (dictum); Berman v. Berman, 193
Md. 614, 69 A.2d 271 (1949); Nickel v. Brown, 75 Md. 172, 23 A. 736 (1892); Baltimore &
H.R.R. v. Algire, 65 Md. 337, 4 A. 293 (1886).
39. E.g., Johns v. Reardon, 3 Md. Ch. 57 (1852), aff'd sub nom. Johns v. Scott, 5
Md. 81 (1853).
40. E.g., Stebbins-Anderson Co. v. Bolton, 208 Md. 183, 117 A.2d 908 (1955);
Caltrider v. Caples, 160 Md. 392, 153 A. 445 (1930); Dyson v. Simmons, 48 Md. 207
(1878); Cooke's Lessee v. Kell, 13 Md. 469 (1859); Salmon v. Claggett, 3 Bland 125 (Md.
Ch. 1830); see, e.g., Bourke v. Krick, 304 F.2d 501 (4th Cir. 1962) (dictum); West v.
Pusey, 113 Md. 569, 77 A. 973 (1910); Nickel v. Brown, 75 Md. 172, 23 A. 736 (1892);
Price v. McDonald, 1 Md. 403, 54 Am. Dec. 657 (1851); Johns v. Reardon, 3 Md. Ch. 57
(1852), aff'd sub nom. Johns v. Scott, 5 Md. 81 (1853); Gill v. Griffith, 2 Md. Ch. 270
(1848).
41. E.g., Price v. McDonald, 1 Md. 403, 54 Am. Dec. 657 (1851); Salmon v. Clagett,
3 Bland 125 (Md. Ch. 1830); see, e.g., Bourke v. Krick, 304 F.2d 501 (4th Cir. 1962);
West v. Pusey, 113 Md. 569, 77 A. 973 (1910); Nickel v. Brown, 75 Md. 172, 23 A. 736
(1892); Dyson v. Simmons, 48 Md. 207 (1878); Johns v. Reardon, 3 Md. Ch. 57 (1852)
aff'd sub nom. Johns v. Scott, 5 Md. 81 (1853); Gill v. Griffith, 2 Md. Ch. 270 (1848).
42. Compare Berman v. Berman, 193 Md. 614, 69, A.2d 271 (1949) (holding that a
gratuitous unacknowledged and unrecorded deed of land is void even as between the
parties thereto) with cases cited in notes 40 & 41 supra (which involved transactions
for consideration).
43. See, e.g., Caltrider v. Caples, 160 Md. 392, 153 A. 445 (1930); Cramer v.
Roderick, 128 Md. 422, 98 A. 42 (1916); West v. Pusey, 113 Md. 569, 77 A. 973 (1910);
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which effectively transfers to the grantee the equitable title to the
land purportedly conveyed by the deed without the need for
recordation. 44 It follows, therefore, that such a deed, like a contract
to convey, 45 cannot be effective at all, even between the parties or
against those with notice of their transaction, unless it complies
with the requirements of the Statute of Frauds.46
In conformity with these doctrines, the legal title to Maryland
land which is sold at a tax sale or by a trustee at a chancery sale
vests in its purchaser only upon the delivery to him of a duly
executed deed to such land.47 This vesting is retroactive to the day of
the sale,48 but apparently occurs only when the deed is recorded. 49
Absent such a deed, the purchaser of land at a tax sale or a chancery
sale acquires only an equitable title to the land.50
Hearn v. Purnell, 110 Md. 458, 72 A. 906 (1909); Nickel v. Brown, 75 Md. 172, 23 A. 736
(1892); Johns v. Reardon, 3 Md. Ch. 57 (1852), aff'd sub nom. Johns v. Scott, 5 Md. 81
(1853).
44. E.g., Kingsley v. Makay, 253 Md. 24, 251 A.2d 585 (1969); Stebbins-Anderson
Co. v. Bolton, 208 Md. 183, 117 A.2d 908 (1955); West v. Pusey, 113 Md. 569, 77 A. 973
(1910). But cf. United States Ins. Co. v. Shriver, 3 Md. Ch. 381 (1851), aff'd sub nom.
General Ins. Co. v. United States Ins. Co., 10 Md. 517 (1857) (conveyances of equitable
interests in land, as distinct from contracts to convey land, must be recorded to be
valid other than as between the parties or as against those with notice).
45. Forsyth v. Brillhart, 216 Md. 437, 140 A.2d 904 (1958). For a discussion of this
case, see text accompanying notes 142 & 143 infra.
46. 1677, 29 Car. 2, c. 3, §§ I-III, IV(4). Sections I to III and IV(4) of the Statute of
Frauds of 1677 formed part of the received common law of the State of Maryland. J.
ALEXANDER, A COLLECTION OF THE BRITISH STATUTES IN FORCE IN MARYLAND
508-09 (1870); W. KILTY, A REPORT OF ALL SUCH ENGLISH STATUTES As EXISTED AT
THE TIME OF THE FIRST EMIGRATION OF THE PEOPLE OF MARYLAND, AND WHICH BY
EXPERIENCE HAVE BEEN FOUND APPLICABLE TO THEIR LOCAL AND OTHER
CIRCUMSTANCES 240-42 (1811). They remained as part of the received common law
until they were "repealed" by ch. 649, § 5, 1971 Md. Laws 1365, and reenacted as MD.
ANN. CODE art. 39C, §§ 1 to 3 and 4(d) (Cum. Supp. 1971). These sections were again
repealed and reenacted by ch. 349, § 1, 1972 Md. Laws 1013-14, as MD. ANN. CODE art.
21, §§2-101 to -103 & 2-104(d) (Cum. Supp. 1972). These provisions presently are
found at MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. §§5-101 to -104 (1974).
47. E.g., Union Trust Co. v. Biggs, 153 Md. 50, 137 A. 509 (1927) (chancery sale -
mortgage foreclosure); Mayor of Baltimore v. Peat, 93 Md. 696, 50 A. 152, 50 A. 698
(1901) (chancery sale); Young v. Ward, 88 Md. 413, 41 A. 925 (1898) (tax sale); Sanders
v. McDonald, 63 Md. 503 (1885) (chancery sale); see, e.g., Lannay v. Wilson, 30 Md. 536
(1869) (chancery sale - mortgage foreclosure); Dalrymple v. Taneyhill, 4 Md. Ch. 171
(1853) (chancery sale).
48. E.g., Union Trust Co. v. Biggs, 153 Md. 50, 137 A. 509 (1927) (chancery sale);
Mayor of Baltimore v. Peat, 93 Md. 696, 50 A. 152, 50 A. 698 (1901) (chancery sale);
Dalrymple v. Taneyhill, 4 Md. Ch. 171 (1853) (chancery sale). But see Sanders v.
McDonald, 63 Md. 503 (1885) (chancery sale).
49. E.g., Mayor of Baltimore v. Peat, 93 Md. 696, 50 A. 152, 50 A. 698 (1901)
(chancery sale).
50. E.g., Mayor of Baltimore v. Peat, 93 Md. 696, 50 A. 152, 50 A. 698 (1901)
chancery sale); Young v. Ward, 88 Md. 413, 41 A. 925 (1898) (tax sale); Sanders v.
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On the other hand, when Maryland realty is sold by a sheriff on
execution sale, the legal title to the land apparently passes eo
instanti to the purchaser by operation of law, without any need for a
deed or other writing to effect the passage of legal title to him. 51
Careful analysis, however, indicates that this deviation from the
general rule is more apparent than real; a recorded muniment of title
always has been considered essential to the passage of a nonvoida-
ble legal title to Maryland realty at a sheriffs sale.5 2
In the first place, it uniformly has been held that, "a sheriffs
sale of land being within the Statute of Frauds, some memorandum
in writing is necessary to be made." 53 More specifically, the "sale
must be proved either by a deed, the sheriffs return, or by some note
or memorandum in writing, in order to comply with the requisitions
of the statute of frauds . . . ,,14 Consequently, at the very least, a
McDonald, 63 Md. 503 (1885) (chancery sale); see, e.g., Union Trust Co. v. Biggs, 153
Md. 50, 137 A. 509 (1927) (chancery sale); Lannay v. Wilson, 30 Md. 536 (1869)
(chancery sale).
51. E.g., Remington v. Linthicum, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 84 (1840); Van Ness v. Hyatt,
28 F. Cas. 1044 (C.C.D.C. 1837) (No. 16,867), affl'd, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 294 (1839); Lewis v.
Rippons, 282 Md. 155, 383 A.2d 676 (1978); Preissman v. Crockett, 194 Md. 51, 69 A.2d
797 (1949); Dorsey's Lessee v. Dorsey, 28 Md. 388 (1868) (dictum); Stump v. Henry, 6
Md. 201, 61 Am. Dec. 300 (1854); Alexander v. Walter, 8 Gill 239, 50 Am. Dec. 688 (Md.
1849) (dictum); Tomlinson's Lessee v. Devore, 1 Gill 345 (Md. 1843); Balch v.
Zentmeyer, 11 G. & J. 267 (Md. 1840); Estep and Hall's Lessee v. Weems, 6 G. & J. 303
(Md. 1834); Barney v. Patterson's Lessee, 6 H. & J. 182 (Md. 1823); Boring's Lessee v.
Lemmon, 5 H. & J. 223 (Md. 1821); Duvall v. Waters, 1 Bland 569, 18 Am. Dec. 350
(Md. Ch. 1827). But see Wheaton v. Sexton's Lessee, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 503 (1819)
(stating that title passes by sale, return and deed); Bull's Lessee v. Sheredine, 1 H. &
J. 410 (Md. Gen. Ct. 1803) (same). The difference in the treatment accorded to tax sales
and chancery sales on the one hand, and to execution sales on the other, probably is
attributable to the fact that, while tax and chancery sales are not final or binding
until approved and ratified by the court, e.g., Young v. Ward, 88 Md. 413, 41 A. 925
(1898) (tax sale); Andrews v. Scotton, 2 Bland 629 (Md. Ch. 1822), aff'd sub nom.
Anderson v. Foulke, 2 H. & G. 346 (Md. 1828), execution sales are final when made,
Andrews v. Scotton, 2 Bland 629 (Md. Ch. 1822), aff'd sub nom. Anderson v. Foulke, 2
H. & G. 346 (Md. 1828).
52. See notes 53 to 66 and accompanying text infra.
53. Barney v. Patterson's Lessee, 6 H. & J. 182, 205 (Md. 1823); accord, Remington
v. Linthicum, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 84 (1840); Preissman v. Crockett, 194 Md. 51, 69 A.2d
797 (1949); Warfield v. Dorsey, 39 Md. 299, 17 Am. Rep. 562 (1874) (dictum); Estep and
Hall's Lessee v. Weems, 6 G. & J. 303 (Md. 1834); Hanson v. Barnes' Lessee, 3 G. & J.
359, 22 Am. Dec. 322 (Md. 1831); Fenwick v. Floyd's Lessee, 1 H. & G. 172 (Md. 1827);
Harrison v. Harrison, 1 Md. Ch. 331 (1848); Duvall v. Waters, 1 Bland 569, 18 Am. Dec.
350 (Md. Ch. 1827); see Balch v. Zentmeyer, 11 G. & J. 267 (Md. 1840).
54. Estep and Hall's Lessee v. Weems, 6 G. & J. 303, 306 (Md. 1834); acord,
Alexander v. Walter, 8 Gill 239 (Md. 1849) (dictum); Hanson v. Barnes' Lessee, 3 G. &
J. 359, 22 Am. Dec. 322 (Md. 1831); Fenwick v. Floyd's Lessee, 1 H. & G. 172 (Md.
1827); see, e.g., Langley v. Jones, 33 Md. 171 (1870); Wright v. Orrell, 19 Md. 151 (1862);
Balch v. Zentmeyer, 11 G. & J. 267 (Md. 1840).
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purchaser of land at a sheriffs sale cannot acquire any enforceable
rights to the land, and thus cannot acquire a nonvoidable legal title
to it, absent a writing that evidences the sale in compliance with the
requirements of the Statute of Frauds.55 In fact, there are judicial
55. See Forsyth v. Brillhart, 216 Md. 437, 140 A.2d 904 (1958). There the court
stated:
Notice, actual or constructive, of a contract [for the sale of land] which is
unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds, will not prevent the person having
such notice, who purchases the property from the original owner and receives
a transfer of the title, from obtaining a good title .... [F]or there were no
enforceable equities attaching under the former contract.
Id. at 441-42, 140 A.2d at 907 (1958). The theory that the legal title to land sold on
execution sale passes to the buyer by operation of law without any need for an
instrument in writing to effect such passage appears to be inconsistent with the rule
that a sheriff's sale of land must be "proved" by a "memorandum in writing." See
notes 51, 53 & 54, supra. The theory that the legal title to land sold on execution sale
passes to the buyer by operation of law seems clearly to be based on section III of the
Statute of Frauds, 1677, 29 Car. 2, c. 3, § III, codified in Maryland at MD. REAL PROP.
CODE ANN. § 5-103 (1974), which is the only section that exempts transfers by
operation of law from the writing requirements of the Statute of Frauds. This view is
supported by the fact that the author of Alexander's British Statutes placed his
reference to this theory in the annotations to section III of the Statute of Frauds. See
J. ALEXANDER, supra note 46, at 522. The basis of the rule that a sheriff's sale of land
must be "proved" by a "memorandum in writing" is not so clear, however. Although
the Court of Appeals never has stated which section of the Statute of Frauds requires
that a sheriff's sale of land be "proved" by a memorandum in writing, it apparently
intended to refer either to section III or to section IV(4) of the statute. Section III
provides that "no ... Estates, or Interests, either of Freehold, or Terms of Years, ..
of, in, to, or out of any . . . Lands, Tenements, or Hereditaments, shall . . . be...
granted . . . unless it be by Deed or Note in Writing, signed by the Party so . . .
granting ... the same,. .. or by Act and Operation of law." Statute of Frauds, 1677,
29 Car. 2, c. 3, § III. The present Maryland statute contains substantially identical
language. See MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 5-103 (1974). Section IV(4) provides that
"no Action shall be brought . . . upon any Contract or Sale of Lands . . . or any
Interest in or concerning them . . . unless the Agreement upon which such Action
shall be brought, or some Memorandum or Note thereof shall be in Writing, and
signed by the Party to be charged therewith .... " Statute of Frauds, 1677, 29 Car. 2,
c. 3, §§ IV(4), (6) (emphasis in original). For the current version of this section, see MD.
REAL PROP. CODE ANN. §5-104 (1974), which contains substantially identical
language. To say that the requirement that a sheriffs sale of land be "proved" by a
writing is based on section III appears to conflict with the theory, based on section
III, that the passage of legal title on such a sale occurs by operation of law, without
the need for an instrument in writing. See, e.g., Simonds v. Catlin, 2 Ca. R. 61, 63-64,
Cole & Cai. Cas. 346 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1804). In fact, if such passage of title indeed occurs
by operation of law, then, by reason of section I1, it ought to be provable by parol
evidence. See Morris v. Harris, 9 Gill 19 (Md. 1850). Conversely, if the requirement of a
writing is based on section III, legal title to land sold'at execution sale can pass only
by a writing executed in compliance with the requirements of the Statute of Frauds.
See, e.g., Simonds v. Catlin, 2 Cai. R. 61, Cole & Cai. Cas. 346 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1804).
However, to say that section IV(4) is the basis of the requirement that a sheriff's sale
of land be "proved" by a writing is equally troublesome. Section IV(4) applies in terms
to "any Contract or Sale of Lands." See Statute of Frauds, 1677, 29 Car. 2, c. 3, § IV(4)
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statements to the effect that compliance with the writing require-
ment of the Statute of Frauds is essential to the passage of legal title
to land sold by a sheriff on execution sale.56
(emphasis supplied). However, as a noted authority has said, "[c]ontract or sale, the
expression used in the clause under consideration, clearly means contracts for sale."
C. BROWNE, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS 318 (4th
ed. 1880). Thus, if the requirement of a writing is to be based on section IV(4), a
sheriffs sale of land must be viewed as a contract for the sale of land. Id. See the pres-
ent version of § IV(4) in effect in Maryland, MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 5-104
(1974), which provides that "[n]o action may be brought on any contract for the sale
or disposition of land ... unless the contract on which the action is brought, or some
memorandum or note of it, is in writing and signed by the party to be charged ....
(emphasis supplied). If this is the case, a sheriffs sale necessarily could transfer only
an equitable interest in the land sold to the purchaser, absent a deed which transfers
legal title to the purchaser in consummation of the contract. Leger v. Doyle, 45 S.C.L.
(11 Rich.) 109, 70 Am. Dec. 240 (1857); see, e.g., Kingsley v. Makay, 253 Md. 24, 251
A.2d 585 (1969); Stebbins-Anderson Co. v. Bolton, 208 Md. 183, 117 A.2d 908 (1955);
West v. Pusey, 113 Md. 569, 77 A. 973 (1910)). However, it would appear that the Court
of Appeals based its requirement of a writing on the theory that section IV(4) applies
to sales of land, as distinct from contracts for the sale of land, and thus to sheriffs'
sales of land. This follows from the court's repeated statements, both to the effect that
sheriffs' sales of land are within the Statute of Frauds (the word "Sale" being used in
section IV(4), but not in section III) and to the effect that such sales must be proved by
a writing, (the writing being required by section III to effect a transfer, whereas it is
required by section IV(4) to evidence a transfer). See Remington v. Linthicum, 39 U.S.
(14 Pet.) 84, 92 (1840); Preissman v. Crockett, 194 Md. 51, 61, 69 A.2d 797, 802 (1949);
Warfield v. Dorsey, 39 Md. 299, 307, 17 Am. Rep. 562, 567 (1874) (dictum); Estep and
Hall's Lessee v. Weems, 6 G. & J. 303, 307 (Md. 1834); Barney v. Patterson's Lessee, 6
H. & J. 182, 205 (Md. 1823)).
56. E.g., Preissman v. Crockett, 194 Md. 51, 69 A.2d 797 (1949). There the court
stated:
In this case the property was sold to the appellant, a receipt with a copy of the
advertisement of the property given to the purchaser, signed by the
auctioneer, and appellant passed his check for the full amount of the sale.
This was a compliance with the Statute of Frauds, and title to the property
sold then passed to the appellant.
Id. at 61, 69 A.2d at 802 (1949) (emphasis added). Similarly, in Balch v. Zentmeyer, 11
G. & J. 267 (Md. 1840), the court stated:
Palmer could not be considered as a purchaser without notice. .. That this
was known to Palmer... is abundantly apparent from his inquiry made of
the sheriff, whether he had ever executed a deed to Zentmeyer, not aware that
the sale passed the title, when properly evidenced, and not the sheriffs deed,
he rejoiced at the omission of the sheriff to make the deed ....
Id. at 282 (emphasis on proper names in original; other emphasis added). It should
be noted that, in most jurisdictions, it has been held that the legal title to land sold by
a sheriff on execution sale passes to the buyer only upon the execution and delivery to
him by the sheriff of a deed to the land or, possibly, of some other instrument in
writing that complies with the Statute of Frauds. A. FREEMAN, A TREATISE ON THE
LAw OF EXECUTIONS IN CIVIL CASES § 324 (3d ed. 1900); e.g., Simonds v. Catlin, 2 Cai.
R. 61, Cole & Cai. Cas. 346 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1804); Leger v. Doyle, 45 S.C.L. (11 Rich.)
109, 70 Am. Dec. 240 (1857); see, e.g., Duff v. Randall, 116 Cal. 226, 48 P. 66 (1897);
Jackson v. Terry, 13 Johns. 471 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1816); Oviatt v. Brown, 14 Ohio 285
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Moreover, not only must a sheriffs sale of land be "proved" by a
writing, but such writing also must be recorded.57 Recording is
required for the same reasons which require all conveyances of land
to be recorded: 58 "[i]n no other way can the leading object of the
legislature, the 'securing the estates of purchasers' be effected; their
design was, that all rights, incumbrances, or conveyances, touching,
connected with, or in any wise concerning land, should appear upon
the public records. '
59
(1846). Contra, e.g., Jouet v. Mortimer, 29 La. Ann. 206 (1877); Flemming v. Powell, 2
Tex. 225 (1847). Moreover, in light of the Maryland doctrine that one must have legal
title to land at the time an action in ejectment is instituted therefor, in order to
prosecute or defend such action successfully, e.g., Remington v. Linthicum, 39 U.S.
(14 Pet.) 84 (1840); Lannay v. Wilson, 30 Md. 536 (1869), the Maryland "rule" that title
to land sold on execution sale passes immediately to the buyer, by operation of law,
may have been devised to enable the buyer to prosecute or defend an action of
ejectment for the land so purchased even though he had not obtained a deed from the
sheriff by the time the action was commenced. This "rule" was instituted without
either explanatory reasoning or supporting authority in Boring's Lessee v. Lemmon, 5
H. & J. 223 (Md. 1821) (involving an action of ejectment by a successor in interest to
the judgment debtor against an execution purchaser of land who apparently had not
received a deed from the sheriff). For examples of application of the rule in Boring's
Lessee to ejectment actions brought by execution purchasers of land, see Remington v.
Linthicum, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 84 (1840); Estep and Hall's Lessee v. Weems, 6 G. & J. 303
(Md. 1834); Barney v. Patterson's Lessee, 6 H. & J. 182 (Md. 1823).
57. E.g., Coombs v. Jordan, 3 Bland 284, 22 Am. Dec. 236 (Md. Ch. 1831); Duvall
v. Waters, 1 Bland 569, 18 Am. Dec. 350 (Md. Ch. 1827); MD. R.P. 619b, derived from
MD. ANN. CODE art. 17, § 35 (1951), which had its origins in ch. 119, §§ 7 & 8, 1817 Md.
Laws 129. Rule 619b requires that "[t]he clerk shall record the proceedings in every
action where the title to real estate has been decided by judgment and where any land
or tenement has been seized or sold under execution, together with return of such
execution." A few cases state, expressly or by implication, that the requisite written
evidence of an execution sale of land must be recorded. Coombs v. Jordan, 3 Bland
284, 309, 22 Am. Dec. 236, 257 (Md. Ch. 1831) (by implication); Duvall v. Waters, 1
Bland 569, 590, 18 Am. Dec. 350, 368 (Md. Ch. 1827) (expressly).
58. See, e.g., Coombs v. Jordan, 3 Bland 284, 22 Am. Dec. 236 (Md. Ch. 1831);
Duvall v. Waters, 1 Bland 569, 18 Am. Dec. 350 (Md. Ch. 1827). In Duvall the court
stated:
In Maryland, for the purpose of executing and conforming to this British
statute, the writ of fieri facias was so altered as to command, that the debt
should be levied of "the lands and tenements," as well as of the goods and
chattels of the defendant. And as an English statute passed in the year 1676,
29 Car. 2, c. 3, s. 3, and which had been then adopted here, had declared that
no estate or interest in lands, exceeding the term of three years, should be
assigned or granted unless by deed or note in writing; and as the Acts of
Assembly required all conveyances of any estate, for above seven years, in
lands to be in writing and recorded. 1715, ch. 47. It seems to have been always
considered and held, that, although the title to land, as in case of a levy of the
fieri facias upon personalty, passed by the sale made by the sheriff; yet some
written evidence of the sale was necessary, and that such evidence should be
recorded.
Id. at 590, 18 Am. Dec. at 368.
59. Hays v. Richardson, 1 G. & J. 366, 384 (Md. 1829); accord, United States v.
Gallas, 269 F. Supp. 141 (D. Md. 1967); Grayson v. Buffington, 233 Md. 340, 196 A.2d
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Maryland law contemplates that, in the normal course of events,
the recorded writing evidencing the sale shall be the sheriffs return.
After selling land on execution sale, the sheriff is required to file a
return evidencing the sale,6° which return must be recorded. 61 Once a
return is recorded, the record operates as constructive notice which
protects the purchaser at the sheriffs sale against all subsequent
purchasers, even those for value and without actual notice, of the
same land either from the same or another sheriff or from the
judgment debtor himself.6 2 In fact, the entire proceedings, including
the judgment and the writ of execution, as well as the return, operate
as constructive notice of the sale, if and when they are recorded,6 3
893 (1964); Lowes v. Carter, 124 Md. 678, 93 A. 216 (1915); South Baltimore Harbor &
Improvement Co. v. Smith, 85 Md. 537, 37 A. 27 (1897); Nickel v. Brown, 75 Md. 172, 23
A. 736 (1892); Hoffman v. Gosnell, 75 Md. 577, 594, 24 A. 28, 32 (1892) ("[T]he object of
the registry laws was to prevent frauds actual or constructive from being perpetrated,
through the medium of unrecorded instruments, which are intended to qualify
muniments of title which gave record notice of absolute ownership."); Murguiondo v.
Hoover, 72 Md. 9, 18 A. 907 (1889); Sitler v. McComas, 66 Md. 135, 138, 6 A. 527, 528
(1886) ("[T]he prime object of the registry laws [is] to preserve evidence of the true
state of the title."); Cooke's Lessee v. Kell, 13 Md. 469 (1859); Hudson v. Warner and
Vance, 2 H. & G. 415 (Md. 1828); United States Ins. Co. v. Shriver, 3 Md. Ch. 381
(1851), aff'd sub nom. General Ins. Co. v. United States Ins. Co., 10 Md. 517 (1857); Gill
v. Griffith, 2 Md. Ch. 270 (1848); Salmon v. Clagett, 3 Bland 125 (Md. Ch. 1830);
Jackson v. Terry, 13 Johns. 471 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1816).
60. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 2-302(a) (Cum. Supp. 1978).
61. MD. R.P. 619b. This rule is derived from MD. ANN. CODE art. 17, § 35 (1951),
which had its origins in ch. 119, §§ 7 & 8, 1817 Md. Laws 129. Similarly, in Duvall v.
Waters, 1 Bland 569, 590, 18 Am. Dec. 350, 368 (Md. Ch. 1827), the court stated,
without reference to the 1817 statute, that the return required to be made by the sheriff
must be recorded.
62. See, e.g., Balch v. Zentmeyer, 11 G. & J. 267 (Md. 1840) (dictum); 61 OP. MD.
ATr'Y GEN. 87, 93-95 (1976). In Balch, the court denied the claim to priority of one
Palmer, who received a deed from the judgment debtor, Hay, after the land in question
was sold by the sheriff and a deed executed by him to the execution purchaser. The
court stated that "Palmer could not be considered as a purchaser without notice. The
return of the sheriff, connected with the levy, made long before his deed from Hay,
indicated that there had been a sale of the land by the sheriff to some one." 11 G. & J.
at 282.
63. E.g., Darraugh v. Preissman, 193 Md. 448, 67 A.2d 262 (1949) (judgment
operates as constructive notice); Manton v. Hoyt, 43 Md. 254 (1875) (same); Balch v.
Zentmeyer, 11 G. & J. 267 (Md. 1840) (dictum) (return operates as constructive notice);
see, e.g., Blanch v. Collison, 174 Md. 427, 432-33, 199 A. 466, 469 (1938); Murguiondo
v. Hoover, 72 Md. 9, 18 A. 907 (1889); Sanders v. McDonald, 63 Md. 503 (1885);
Manahan v. Sammon, 3 Md. 463 (1853); 61 OP. MD. Arr'Y GEN. 87 (1976). In Sanders,
the court stated:
Moreover, the proceedings being for the sale of mortgaged premises consisting
of real estate, they were proceedings in rem ... and the decree, and all the
proceedings upon which it was based, and the proceedings had thereunder,
are, by statute, required to be recorded, and any person dealing with the
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because their record is mandated by law.64 Moreover, it has been
held that the rule that legal title to land sold by a sheriff on
execution sale passes to the purchaser by operation of law, applies
only when the sale is made under an execution issued by a court of
record, the proceedings of which are a matter of public record and
thus operate as constructive notice.65 If, however, no return is made
by the sheriff, or if the sheriffs return is not recorded, some other
writing, normally a deed from the sheriff, must be made and
recorded before a purchaser of land at a sheriff's sale acquires a
nonvoidable legal title to the land as against subsequent purchasers
for value and without notice. 66
subject-matter of the decree must be taken to have had notice of the legal
import and operation of all such proceedings.
63 Md. at 510 (1885). Similarly, in Manahan the court said: "Here, too, the insolvent
papers being filed before the sale, and therefore being matters of record, Sammon is
considered as having knowledge of Greene's application. Under these circumstances
Sammon took no title by the sale .... 3 Md. at 472. In Murguiondo, which in-
volved an analogous situation, the Circuit Court of Baltimore City decreed a sale of
mortgaged land lying partly within Baltimore City and partly within Baltimore
County. Before the bill, the decree, and the trustee's report of sale in the Baltimore
City proceeding were filed in Baltimore County as required by statute, MD. ANN.
CODE art. 16, §72 (1888), the land in Baltimore County was sold and conveyed,
pursuant to proceedings in Baltimore County, to one who had no actual notice of the
Baltimore City Circuit Court proceedings. The court held that the purchaser of the
Baltimore County land had priority, stating, with respect to § 72 of art. 16 of the Code
of 1888:
Evidently, the Legislature meant to provide for notice to all who might treat
with the owners or apparent owners of the land for the sale, lease or loan on
mortgage of the exact condition of title. The design was clearly the same as
underlies the registry laws and was supplemental of them .... The diligence
needed in the record of deeds, to protect against subsequent transactions in
ignorance of the deed given, should also be required here... . It has always
and frequently been decided in this State that the object of our laws for the
registry of deeds and mortgages was to prevent abuses and deceits growing
out of pretended titles .... As we have said, the Legislature manifestly had
the same object in view in making the provision under discussion. It was
intended to keep people advised of proceedings taking place in a place or
county where the lands did not lie and which affected the lands where they
did lie. The statute fixes no time within which it shall be done. But in
harmony with the rule which obtains in the registry of deeds and mortgages,
and to secure the object sought, the statute ought to be construed as requiring
this record notice to be given, at least, before a sale of the lands.
72 Md. at 15-16, 18 A. at 908-09 (1889).
64. MD. R.P. 619.
65. Dorsey's Lessee v. Dorsey, 28 Md. 388 (1868) (title to land sold under an
execution issued by a justice of the peace (a court not of record) passes to the
purchaser only when the sale has been ratified and confirmed, unlike the result where
the sale is under an execution issued by a court of record).
66. See Duvall v. Waters, 1 Bland 569, 18 Am. Dec. 350 (Md. Ch. 1827); Kent Bldg.
& Loan Co. v. Middleton, 112 Md. 10, 75 A. 967 (1910). In Duvall, the court stated that
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Moreover, whatever the rule may have been in the past, the legal
title to land sold by a sheriff on execution sale now should be held to
pass to the buyer only by the recordation of a duly executed deed
made by the sheriff. Sheriffs are under a duty, recognized by the
legislature, to convey the land sold by them on execution sale to the
buyer.67 This duty now is imposed by statute, effective in 1974,68 that
for the first time in Maryland's legislative history, requires a sheriff
to convey the legal title to land sold by him on execution sale to the
buyer. The legislative imposition of this duty on the sheriff may
itself be sufficient to mandate that legal title to land sold on
execution sale passes to the buyer only upon execution and
recordation of a deed to him.6 9 Even prior to the enactment of this
"[ilt seems to have been always considered and held, that, although the title to land
... passed by the sale made by the sheriff; yet some written evidence of the sale was
necessary, and that evidence should be recorded." 1 Bland at 590, 18 Am. Dec. at 368
(emphasis added).
67. See MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 11-509 (1974) ("If a sheriff sells any
interest. .. in any property, he shall convey it to the purchaser upon payment of the
purchase price"). That the legislature even prior to the enactment of section 11-509 of
the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article considered sheriffs to be under a duty to
convey land sold by them on execution sale is indicated further by Article 87, section
25, of the Maryland Annotated Code, which provided that:
If any sheriff shall make sale of any lands or tenements and shall die without
executing a deed of conveyance to the purchaser, the court out of which the
execution issued under which the lands were sold may, on the application of
the purchaser . . . order and direct the sheriff for the time being . . . to
execute a deed of conveyance to the purchaser. . . . This section shall apply
to all officers making sales under executions.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 87, § 25 (1957). This language first was enacted as ch. 102, § 4,
1813 Md. Laws 91, and remained in force continuously, with minor variations, until it
was repealed. Ch. 2, § 2, 1973 Md. Laws 1st Spec. Sess. 4. It was replaced by section
2-103 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, which merely provides that
"[w]hen an officer leaves office for any reason, any duty not fully performed,
including the collection of fees, becomes the responsibility of his successor in office."
Apparently, however, no change in the law was intended. See Revisor's Note to MD.
CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 2-103 (1974). For judicial recognition that a sheriff is
under a duty to convey the land sold by him on execution sale to the purchaser, see
Warfield v. Dorsey, 39 Md. 299, 17 Am. Rep. 562 (1874); Langley v. Jones, 33 Md. 171
(1870).
68. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 11-509 (1974). Prior to the effective date
of this statute, only a purchaser of an equitable interest in land at a sheriffs sale was
statutorily entitled to an "assignment or conveyance of such equitable interest" from
the sheriff. MD. ANN. CODE art. 83, § 2 (1969), first enacted as ch. 60, § 10, 1794 Md.
Laws.
69. See Young v. Ward, 88 Md. 413, 421, 41 A. 925, 928 (1898). There the court
stated: "But an order of ratification of a sale, in a proceeding under a statute which
contemplates the execution of a deed to pass the legal title, will only give the
purchaser an equitable title unless the statute otherwise provides .... "
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statute, moreover, Maryland sheriffs, in practice, always have
conveyed the land sold by them on execution sale to the buyers of
that land.70 And this practice has been recognized by the legislature
for many years. For example, the legislature has provided a
statutory form of sheriffs deed since 1856,7' and, until 1974, it
expressly provided for the appointment of someone to execute a deed
to the buyer at an execution sale if the sheriff died before doing 80.72
Because such an unvarying practice virtually mandates a holding
that "the law conforms to the practice," 73 a deed from the sheriff
must be considered essential to the conveyance of a nonvoidable
legal title to the land sold by him.
If, as indicated above, the execution of a deed by the sheriff is
essential to the passage of a nonvoidable legal title to land sold on
execution sale, such a deed must be recorded to render it valid and
effective other than merely between the parties to the conveyance
and against those with notice of it.74 Consequently, such a deed
clearly is subject to the priorities provisions of the recording act.75
Thus, if a purchaser at an execution sale records his deed from the
sheriff first, he clearly is entitled to protection against subsequent
purchasers, 76 and, if he is a bona fide purchaser for value and
70. 25 Op. MD. ATr'y GEN. 466 (1940) (describing this practice); see e.g., Boring v.
Lemmon, 5 H. & J. 223 (1821).
71. See ch. 154, § 72, 1856 Md. Laws 253. The present section prescribing the form
of sheriff's deed is MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 4-202(d) (1974).
72. MD. ANN. CODE art. 87, § 25 (1957), repealed by ch. 2, § 2, 1973 Md. Laws 1st
Sp. Sess.4. See note 67 supra.
73. In Hays v. Richardson, 1 G. & J. 366 (Md. 1829), the Court of Appeals held
that grants and conveyances of de novo rights of way should be acknowledged and
recorded in the same manner as deeds conveying corporeal interests in land. In
support of its conclusion, the court stated:
If we entertained even strong doubts as to what originally should have
been the construction of this Act of Assembly (of which we have none) they
would in a moment be removed by adverting to the single fact,. . . that from
the year 1767 to the present day, grants and conveyances of de novo rent
charges, rights of way, &c. have been as uniformly acknowledged and
recorded, as deeds conveying the land itself. This contemporaneous unvarying
construction of the Act of Assembly for sixty years, ought not to be
disregarded but upon the most imperious and conclusive grounds.
Id. at 385. For other examples of judicial recognition that "the law conforms to the
practice," see Tayloe v. Thomson's Lessee, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 358 (1831); Westpark, Inc. v.
Seaton Land Co., 225 Md. 433, 171 A.2d 736 (1961); Arnreich v. State, 150 Md. 91, 132
A. 430 (1926) (citing and quoting from Hays with approval).
74. See notes 34 to 42 and accompanying text supra.
75. See MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 3-203 (1974). E.g., Johns v. Reardon, 3 Md.
Ch. 57 (1852), aff'd sub nom. Johns v. Scott, 5 Md. 81 (1853); see, e.g., Nickel v. Brown,
75 Md. 172, 23 A. 736 (1892).
76. See, e.g., Cooke's Lessee v. Kell, 13 Md. 469 (1859).
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without notice, he has an equally clear right to protection against
prior purchasers. 77
APPLICATION OF THE PRIORITIES PROVISIONS OF RECORDING
ACTS TO SHERIFFS' SALES IF TITLE
PASSES BY OPERATION OF LAW
Even if the legal title to land sold by a sheriff on execution sale
is considered to pass to the purchaser without any need for the
execution or recording of a sheriff's deed, it seems clear that such a
deed, if it is in fact executed and recorded, should be subject to, and
entitled to the benefits of, the priorities provisions of the recording
act.
78
As previously indicated,79 the purpose of the recording acts is "to
avoid abuses and deceits by mortgages and pretended titles, and for
the protection of creditors, '' s by requiring that "all rights, incum-
brances, or conveyances, touching, connected with, or in any wise
concerning land, should appear upon the public records."81 These
records serve as "'notice to all the world, so that there may be no
deceit practiced upon any one.' "82
The recording acts accomplish this purpose in two ways. First,
specified transfers of land or interests in land are rendered void,
except between the parties and against those with. notice of the
transfer, unless they are effected by duly recorded instruments in
writing.8 3 This may be termed the validating function of recording.
Sec6nd, priorities are established between successive transfers of
land or interests in land of a type entitled to recordation, based, in
77. See, e.g., Busey v. Reese, 38 Md. 254 (1873); United States Ins. Co. v. Shriver, 3
Md. Ch. 381 (1851), aff'd sub noma. General Ins. Co. v. United States Ins. Co., 10 Md.
517 (1857).
78. See MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 3-203 (1974).
79. See notes 58 & 59 and accompanying text supra; Aigler, supra note 1;
Philbrick, Limits of Record Search and Therefore of Notice, Part I, 93 U. PA. L. REV.
125 (1944).
80. Hoffman v. Gosnell, 75 Md. 577, 590, 24 A. 28, 31 (1892); accord, Grayson v.
Buffington, 233 Md. 340, 196 A.2d 893 (1964); see Cooke's Lessee v. Kell, 13 Md. 469
(1859).
81. Hays v. Richardson, 1 G. & J. 366, 384 (Md. 1829); accord, South Baltimore
Harbor & Improvement Co. v. Smith, 85 Md. 537, 37 A. 27 (1897); United States Ins.
Co. v. Shriver, 3 Md. Ch. 381 (1851), aff'd sub nom. General Ins. Co. v. United States
Ins. Co., 10 Md. 517 (1857).
82. Cooke's Lessee v. Kell, 13 Md. 469, 493 (1859) (quoting Williams v. Banks, 11
Md. 198, 250 (1857)).
83. See notes 34 to 42 and accompanying text supra.
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part at least, on the sequence in which they are validly recorded.8 4
Except in a "race" jurisdiction,8 5 this may be viewed as the notice
function of recording.8 6
At common law, priority in right generally was determined by
priority in time.8 7 This is because once the owner of land validly
transferred it, he had no interest remaining in himself that he could
convey to a subsequent transferee.88 If a land owner made successive
transfers of his land or of interests in it, the first transferee in point
of time usually had priority.89 The only major exception to the
general rule gave preference to the subsequent transferee if the first
transferee received only an equitable interest in the land and the
subsequent transferee acquired a legal estate in the same land for
value and without notice of the prior transfer 0 All three types of
recording acts have changed the common law priority rules by
making priority of recording to some extent determinative of priority
of right.91 For example, application of a notice-race statute, such as
that in effect in Maryland,92 to successive land transfers of a type
entitled to recordation entitles the first transferee to priority against
all subsequent transferees if his transfer also is the first to be validly
recorded. 93 However, the first transferee is not entitled to priority
against any subsequent transfer made to one who took for value and
without notice of the prior transfer and who first validly recorded the
transfer made to him.94
84. See Aigler, supra note 1, at 405-07; Philbrick, supra note 79, at 127-28. For the
section of the Maryland act concerning priorities, see MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN
§ 3-203 (1974):
Every recorded deed or other instrument takes effect from its effective
date as against the grantee of any deed executed and delivered subsequent to
the effective date, unless the grantee of the subsequent deed has:
(1) Accepted delivery of the deed or other instrument
(i) In good faith,
(ii) Without constructive notice under § 3-202, and
(iii) For a good and valuable consideration, and
(2) Recorded the deed first.
85. See note 9 and accompanying text supra.
86. See Aigler, supra note 1, at 409-14; Philbrick, supra note 79, at 146-47.
87. See notes 1 & 3 and accompanying text supra.
88. See note 2 and accompanying text supra.
89. See notes 1 & 3 and accompanying text supra.
90. See note 3 and accompanying text supra.
91. See note 4 and accompanying text supra.
92. See MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 3-203 (1974).
93. MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 3-203 (1974); Cooke's Lessee v. Kell, 13 Md. 469
(1859).
94. MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 3-203 (1974); Busey v. Reese, 38 Md. 264 (1873);
United States Ins. Co. v. Shriver, 3 Md. Ch. 381 (1851), aff'd sub nom. General Ins. Co.
v. United States Ins. Co., 10 Md. 517 (1857).
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Thus, while at common law the first transferee of land generally
had priority, the effect of the priorities provisions of the recording
acts is that the failure of the first transferee to record leaves the
transferor with the power to transfer a good title to a subsequent
bona fide purchaser for value and without notice, thereby divesting
the title of the first transferee. 95 In other words, the effect of the
priorities provisions of the recording acts
really is that the person claiming under the instrument in
question by his failure to observe the direction of the statute
confers upon the party who executed the instrument.. . a sort
of statutory power to displace the interest vested by the
execution of the instrument. This power may be effectively
exercised only in favor of those specified in the statute, usually
subsequent purchasers and incumbrancers. The recording
ordinarily has no effect so far as the vesting of the intended
interest in the transferee is concerned; the interest vests as fully
and completely without as with recording. The failure to record
simply puts someone into a position to divest that interest.9 6
The Maryland recording acts provide for the recordation of two
types of transfers: those that must be recorded if they are to be valid
other than between the parties to the conveyance and against those
with notice of it, 97 and those that may be recorded, although their
validity in no wise is dependent upon recordation. 98 Not only does
recordation of either type of transfer operate as constructive notice
95. Aigler, supra note 1, at 415, 416; Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as
Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710, 756 (1917); Philbrick, supra note 79,
at 157; see, e.g., Boynton v. Haggart, 120 F. 819 (8th Cir.) (dictum), cert. denied, 191
U.S. 573 (1903); McClure v. Tallman, 30 Iowa 515 (1870); Burns v. Berry, 42 Mich. 176,
3 N.W. 924 (1879); Hetzel v. Barber, 69 N.Y. 1 (1877); Jackson v. Chamberlain, 8 Wend.
620 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1832); Lessee of Paine v. Mooreland, 15 Ohio 435 (1846); Zimmer v.
Sundell, 237 Wis. 270, 296 N.W. 589 (1941).
96. Aigler, supra note 1, at 415; accord, Hohfeld, supra note 95, at 756; Philbrick,
supra note 79, at 157.
97. MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. §3-101(a) (1974). See notes 34 to 42 and
accompanying text supra.
98. See MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 3-102 (1974), which provides: "Any other
instrument affecting property, including any contract for the grant of property or any
subordination agreement establishing priorities between interests in property, may be
recorded. The recording of any instrument constitutes constructive notice from the
date of recording." E.g., Bourke v. Krick, 304 F.2d 501 (4th Cir. 1962); Kingsley v.
Makay, 253 Md. 24, 251 A.2d 585 (1969); Westpark, Inc. v. Seaton Land Co., 225 Md.
433, 171 A.2d 736 (1961); Lowes v. Carter, 124 Md. 678, 93 A. 216 (1915); South
Baltimore Harbor & Improvement Co. v. Smith, 85 Md. 537, 37 A. 27 (1897).
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which protects the transferee against a subsequent transfer,99 but, if
the transferee is a bona fide purchaser for value and without notice
who records first, it also operates to protect the transferee against all
prior transfers that may be, but are not, recorded, even those whose
validity is not dependent upon recording. 1°° That is to say, the
priorities provisions of the Maryland recording acts1° ' apply to all
instruments entitled to be recorded, not merely to those whose
recording is essential to a valid transfer of legal title.10 2
The history of the priorities provisions of the Maryland
recording acts demonstrates that the acts were intended to apply in
this manner. Maryland has had a notice-race priority statute since
1825.103 Between 1860 and 1972, the application of the statute was
limited "to all deeds of mortgage, and to all other deeds or
conveyances to the validity of which recording is necessary.' 10 4 In
99. The recordation of a transfer whose recording is essential to its validity
operates as constructive notice of the transfer. E.g., Cooke's Lessee v. Kell, 13 Md. 469
(1859). The recordation of a transfer which may be recorded, although its validity is
not dependent upon recordation, also operates as constructive notice of the recorded
transfer. E.g., Bourke v. Krick, 304 F.2d 501 (4th Cir. 1962); Lowes v. Carter, 124 Md.
678, 93 A. 216 (1915); South Baltimore Harbor & Improvement Co. v. Smith, 85 Md.
537, 37 A. 27 (1897).
100. Recordation protects the transferee against prior transfers that must be, but
are not, recorded, e.g., Busey v. Reese, 38 Md. 264 (1873); United States Ins. Co. v.
Shriver, 3 Md. Ch. 381 (1851), aff'd sub nom. General Ins. Co. v. United States Ins.
Co., 10 Md. 517 (1857), and against prior transfers which may be, but need not be and
are not, recorded, see, e.g., Bourke v. Krick, 304 F.2d 501 (4th Cir. 1962). See notes 103
to 121 and accompanying text infra.
101. MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. §3-203 (1974).
102. See, e.g., Lowes v. Carter, 124 Md. 678, 93 A. 216 (1915); South Baltimore
Harbor & Improvement Co. v. Smith, 85 Md. 537, 37 A. 27 (1897); Johns v. Reardon, 3
Md. Ch. 57 (1852), aff'd sub nom. Johns v. Scott, 5 Md. 81 (1853); United States Ins.
Co. v. Shriver, 3 Md. Ch. 381 (1851), aff'd sub nom. General Ins. Co. v. United States
Ins. Co., 10 Md. 517 (1857). For a discussion of this proposition, see notes 103 to 121
and accompanying text infra.
103. Ch. 203, § 1, 1825 Md. Laws 201: "... in case of several deeds . . .for the
same lands, . . . the deed . . .which shall be first recorded according to law, shall
have preference ... Provided, that the deed ... so to be preferred, be made bona fide,
and upon good and valuable consideration .. " Between 1860 and 1972, the statute
provided: "Where there are two or more deeds conveying the same land or chattels
real, the deed or deeds which shall be first recorded according to law shall be
preferred, if made bona fide and upon good and valuable consideration." MD. ANN.
CODE art. 21, § 13 (1957), originally enacted as and containing language identical to
MD. CODE PuB. GEN. LAws art. 24, § 17 (1860), repealed by ch. 349, § 1, 1972 Md. Laws
1010. Language substantially similar to this appears at MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN.
§ 3-203 (1974).
104. MD. ANN. CODE. art. 21, § 13 (1957), originally enacted as and containing
language identical to MD. CODE PUB. GEN. LAws art 24, § 17 (1860), repealed by ch.
349, § 1, 1972 Md. Laws 1010.
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1972, however, the legislature repealed the notice-race priority
statute and reenacted it without this restrictive language. 1°5 Thus,
the Maryland legislature expressly changed the priority provision to
apply, 10 6 as it did prior to 1860,107 to all transfers entitled to be
recorded, whether or not recording is essential to their validity.
Moreover, the mere fact that recording is not essential to a valid
transfer of the legal title to land does not preclude application of the
priorities provisions of the recording acts to the transfer. In at least
two situations analogous to the one under discussion - estoppel by
deed and assignment of an expectancy - it has been held that
failure to record the writing evidencing a transfer of title by
operation of law results in loss of priority under the recording acts.
The estoppel by deed situation arises when a transferor duly
executes and delivers to his transferee a conveyance of land that he
does not then own, and he thereafter acquires title to the land which
he previously conveyed. In this situation, the general rule, at least
when the conveyance was made by warranty deed, is that the
transferor is estopped to assert his after-acquired title against his
transferee.10 8 Maryland is in accord with the majority of jurisdic-
tions that observe this rule in holding that title to the after-acquired
property vests in the transferee by inurement, that is, by operation of
law, immediately upon the acquisition of such title by the
transferor:10 9 there is no need either for a further conveyance by the
transferor to his transferee or a judicial decree confirming title in the
transferee." 0 A question of priorities arises, however, if, after the
transferor acquires the title previously conveyed by him, he conveys
it to a second transferee, who is a bona fide purchaser for value and
who records the conveyance before receiving actual notice of the
conveyance to the first transferee. If the first transferee records or
rerecords his deed after the transferor acquires and records the title
and before the transferor conveys the title to the second transferee, it
105. Ch. 349, § 1, 1972 Md. Laws 1010. Compare MD. ANN. CODE art. 21, § 13 (1957),
repealed by Ch. 349, § 1, 1972 Md. Laws 1010, with MD. ANN. CODE art. 21, § 3-203
(Cum. Supp. 1972) (current version at MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 3-203 (1974)). See
Wright v. Nugent, 23 Md. App. 337, 328 A.2d 362 (1974), aff'd, 275 Md. 290, 338 A.2d
898 (1975).
106. MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN § 3-203 (1974).
107. Ch. 203, § 1, 1825 Md. Laws 201.
108. 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 4, § 15.19.
109. See, e.g., Columbian Carbon Co. v. Kight, 207 Md. 203, 114 A.2d 28 (1954);
Poultney v. Emerson, 117 Md. 655, 84 A. 53 (1912); Funk v. Newcomer, 10 Md. 130
(1856).
110. 3 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY, supra note 4, § 15.21.
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seems clear that the first transferee has priority under the recording
acts: he recorded his conveyance after he acquired title to the
property by operation of law and before any transfer was made to
the second transferee."' If, however, the first transferee records his
deed only at some time prior to the acquisition of title by the
transferor, and does not rerecord thereafter, most jurisdictions hold
that the second transferee has priority under the recording acts.112
This conclusion is based upon the theory that the record of the deed
to the first transferee is outside the transferor's chain of title and
thus does not afford constructive notice to the second transferee.1 3
The second transferee therefore is entitled to protection under the
recording acts against the prior improperly recorded transfer by
operation of law." 4 Finally, if the first transferee either fails to
record his deed, or records it only after the second transfer is made
and recorded, which is the situation most closely analogous to the
one under discussion, the second transferee clearly has priority
under the recording acts." 5
A similar result was reached in a case involving the assignment
of an expectancy, the second situation analogous to that under
discussion. In Lena v. Yannelli," 6 a New Jersey court was faced
with the problem of determining the priority between the assignee
under an enforceable assignment of an expectancy and a judgment
creditor of the assignor who obtained his judgment after the
expectancy was realized and before any effective recordation of the
assignment. In 1957, Yannelli effectively assigned his expectant
interest in his mother's estate to his brothers and sisters by an
instrument in writing made for an adequate consideration. On
August 28, 1959, Yannelli's mother died, leaving all of her property,
including the land in question, equally to her four children by a duly
executed will. This will was admitted to probate on September 11,
1959. On December 14, 1959, judgment was entered against Yannelli
in favor of the defendant, Flaster. It was not until December 22,
1959, that Yannelli's 1957 assignment was filed with the Surrogate
of Essex County. By analogy to the estoppel by deed situation, the
111. Semon v. Terhune, 40 N.J. Eq. 364, 2 A. 18 (1885); 3 AMERICAN LAW OF
PROPERTY, supra note 4, § 15.22, at 850 n.8.
112. 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 4, § 15.22; 4 id. § 17.20.
113. 4 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY, supra note 4, § 17.20.
114. Id.
115. Burke v. Beveridge, 15 Minn. 205, 15 Gil. 160 (1870); Aigler, supra note 1, at
417; see Smith v. Williams, 44 Mich. 240, 6 N.W. 662 (1880); W. RAWLE, THE LAw OF
COVENANTS FOR TITLE § 259, at 408-09 n.1 (5th ed. 1887).
116. 78 N.J. Super. 257, 188 A.2d 310 (1963).
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court held that the judgment creditor had priority. In reaching its
conclusion, the court observed:
On the date. . . [the assignment] was executed. . . Yannelli
could not make a conveyance, for he had then no existing
property rights to convey. When ... [his mother] died ... ,
however, something came into existence upon which the
assignment of March 1, 1957 could operate. What had previously
been a mere assignment of an expectancy was converted at that
moment into an effective conveyance . . . without any addi-
tional act on . . . [Yannelli's] part or supplementary document
from him. 117
The court found, however, that although the assignee of the ex-
pectancy would have priority absent an applicable recording act," 8
the assignment of an expectancy was an "instrument of the nature
of a conveyance" which was subject to the New Jersey recording
act.119 Consequently, the assignment was void as to the defendants
because it was not recorded prior to the rendition of the judgment in
their favor and the defendants had no actual knowledge of the
assignment. As the court noted, "if judgments had not been entered
against . . . [Yannelli] or if the assignment had been placed on
record promptly after ... [his mother's] death," the assignment
would have been unassailable. 12°
The Yannelli court supported its conclusion by an explicit
analogy to the estoppel by deed situation. It posed the problem:
If ... Yannelli, instead of executing an assignment, had made
and delivered documents which were deeds in form though not
in fact (because of his lack of ownership), would there be any
serious question about priority for his creditors on judgments
entered against him after his mother's death and before the
recording of the deeds? I think a negative answer to this
question is to be implied . . . such deeds would be instruments
in the nature of conveyances ... and judgment creditors would
be entitled to protection against them .... My conclusion is
that the assignment ... having become entitled at . ..
[Yannelli's mother's] death to the same effect between the
parties as a deed, must be recorded to insure priority over
117. Id. at 261-62, 188 A.2d at 313.
118. Id. at 261, 188 A.2d at 312.
119. Id. at 262, 188 A.2d at 313.
120. Id.
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judgment creditors and the others who, in the absence of
recording, are protected .... 121
The results in these two situations involving transfers by
operation of law - estoppel by deed and assignment of an
expectancy - and their supporting rationale make it clear that the
recording of an instrument entitles it to the benefits of the priorities
provisions of the recording acts if the instrument, though effecting a
valid transfer of title without recording or merely evidencing a
transfer by operation of law, is entitled to be recorded. 122 This is so
even though the recording of an instrument has no effect on
priorities if the instrument is not entitled to be recorded.' 23
A sheriffs deed conveying to the purchaser land sold on
execution sale is clearly entitled to be recorded, 24 even if it is viewed
merely as evidencing a transfer by operation of law. 25 In Baxter v.
Sewell, 26 for example, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that
recordation of a sheriffs deed of land sold by him on execution sale
affords constructive notice which protects the purchaser at the
121. Id. at 263-64, 188 A.2d at 314.
122. See notes 97 to 121 and accompanying text supra.
123. E.g., Berman v. Berman, 193 Md. 614, 69 A.2d 271 (1949) (dictum); Randolph
Wurlitzer Co. v. Cohen, 156 Md. 368, 144 A. 641 (1929); Lowes v. Carter, 124 Md. 678,
93 A. 216 (1915); South Baltimore Harbor & Improvement Co. v. Smith, 85 Md. 537, 37
A. 27 (1897); Sitler v. McComas, 66 Md. 135, 6 A. 527 (1886) (dictum); Glenn v. Davis,
35 Md. 208, 6 Am. Rep. 389 (1872); Cockey v. Milne's Lessee, 16 Md. 200 (1860); Johns
v. Reardon, 3 Md. Ch. 57 (1852), aff'd sub nom. Johns v. Scott, 5 Md. 81 (1853); see,
e.g., United States Ins. Co. v. Shriver, 3 Md. Ch. 381 (1851), aff'd sub noam. General
Ins. Co. v. United States Ins. Co., 10 Md. 517 (1857).
124. See Baxter v. Sewell, 3 Md. 334 (1852); accord, Pollard v. Cocke, 19 Ala. 188
(1851); Hetzel v. Barber, 69 N.Y. 1 (1877); Jackson v. Terry, 13 Johns. 471 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1816); Leger v. Doyle, 45 S.C.L. (11 Rich.) 109 (1857); Massey v. Thompson, 11
S.C.L. (2 Nott. & McC.) 105 (1819); Fitzgerald v. Legrande, 187 S.W.2d 155 (Tex. Ct.
Civ. App. 1945).
125. Even if a deed from the sheriff is not essential to the passage of legal title to
Maryland realty on a sheriffs sale, it is clear that such passage of legal title must be
evidenced by a recordable muniment of title. See notes 53 to 56 and accompanying
text supra. Such muniment of title, moreover, must be recorded, or, at the very least,
may be recorded, since all muniments of title to land are within the policies of the
recording acts, see notes 57 to 66 and accompanying text supra, and its record
operates as constructive notice of its contents. See notes 62 to 65 and accompanying
text supra. Further, whatever prior law may have been, such muniment of title, when
recorded, now is within the protection of the priorities provisions of the recording acts,
at least when the controversy is between two transferees of the same land from the
same sheriff on execution sale, as distinguished from the situation in which the
controversy is between a transferee of land from a judgment debtor and a purchaser
of the same land from a sheriff on execution sale. See notes 179 to 195 and
accompanying text infra.
126. 3 Md. 334 (1852).
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sheriffs sale against a subsequent transferee of the property. The
Baxter court remarked:
But it must be remembered, that the sheriffs deed to Sewell and
his lease to Swan were also recorded, and were notice to these
defendants that Sewell claimed title to the property. They
purchased under Baxter and wife in the face of this notice, and,
if their vendors had no title, they cannot complain if the owner
of the property asserts his rights.127
It is well established, moreover, that a purchaser of land from a
sheriff on execution sale will be protected against subsequent
transfers of such land by the judgment debtor, that is, transfers of
such land made by the judgment debtor after entry of the judgment
under which the land was sold on execution sale.12 When the
transfer is made by the judgment debtor after entry of the judgment
but prior to the execution sale, the priority of the purchaser at the
execution sale generally is said to be based on the fact that the entry
of the judgment operates as constructive notice of the lien of the
judgment to all subsequent transferees from the judgment debtor. 29
On the other hand, when the transfer is made by the judgment
debtor after the execution sale but before the purchaser at the sale
127. Id. at 340. It is interesting to note that, in Baxter, the sequence of events was:
First, Swan, the judgment debtor, transferred the land in question to his daughter.
Although the transfer was duly recorded, it was claimed to be in fraud of Swan's
creditors. After the transfer was made, Sewell and another creditor recovered
judgments against Swan for money owed to them prior to the conveyance to Swan's
daughter. The land in question then was sold under writs of fieri facias issued upon
these judgments, and it was purchased by Sewell, who duly recorded his deed. Sewell
then leased the land to Swan, the judgment debtor. Swan's daughter then transferred
portions of this land to the defendants. As indicated in the text accompanying this
note, however, the defendants were held not to be bona fide purchasers for value and
without notice because the record of Sewell's deed from the sheriff afforded them
constructive notice of his claim. This conclusion is contrary to the general rule that,
If after the recording of a deed from an owner there is later recorded another
deed from the same grantor to a different grantee . . . a purchaser from the
first grantee is without notice of any rights of the second grantee unless it is
by reason of some fact other than the record; the purchaser's obligation to
examine the grantor's indices as to that grantor ceased at the date of
recording of the first deed.
4 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY, supra note 4, § 17.21 at 596-97 (footnote omitted).
128. E.g., Darraugh v. Preissman, 193 Md. 448, 67 A.2d 262 (1949); Manton v. Hoyt,
43 Md. 254 (1875); Miller v. Wilson, 32 Md. 297 (1870); Campbell v. Lowe, 9 Md. 500, 66
Am. Dec. 339 (1856); Balch v. Zentmeyer, 11 G. & J. 267 (Md. 1840); McMechen v.
Marman, 8 G. & J. 57 (Md. 1836).
129. Eg., Darraugh v. Preissman, 193 Md. 448, 67 A.2d 262 (1949); Manton v. Hoyt,
43 Md. 254 (1875).
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obtains a deed from the sheriff, it has been indicated that the record
of the sheriffs return operates as constructive notice which prevents
the judgment debtor's transferee from being a bona fide purchaser
for value and without notice. 13° In both of these situations, the record
of the judgment and the record of the sheriffs return operate as
constructive notice because they are mandated by law,131 that is, by
Rule 619 of the Maryland Rules of Procedure. 132 Consequently, the
fact that the recording of judgments and of sheriffs' returns made
pursuant to them, although mandated by law, is expressly mandated
other than by the statutory provisions generally requiring the
recording of transfers of interests in land,133 probably explains why
the general land recording provisions usually134 are not cited in
situations in which the subsequent transfer is made by the judgment
debtor.
If, however, as in the situation under discussion, both the
subsequent transfer and the prior transfer are made by a sheriff on
execution sale under the same judgment, the record of the judgment
logically cannot afford notice to the sheriffs second transferee of the
rights of the sheriffs first transferee. The only means by which the
sheriffs second transferee could be put on constructive notice of the
rights of the sheriffs first transferee are either the record of the
return made by the sheriff on the sale to his first transferee135 or the
record of the deed made by the sheriff to his first transferee. 36 If,
however, no document evidencing the sheriffs sale to his first
transferee is recorded, we reach the question of the extent to which
the sheriffs second transferee is protected against the sheriffs first
transferee when the second transferee is the first to record. In this
situation, the policy underlying the recording acts dictates that the
loss should fall on the first transferee, whose failure to demand and
130. E.g., Balch v. Zentmeyer, 11 G. & J. 267 (Md. 1840); 61 OP. MD. ATT'Y GEN. 87,
93-95 (1976) (enumerating various records, in addition to the land records and
including sheriffs returns, that provide constructive notice).
131. See notes 62 to 64 and accompanying text supra.
132. MD. R.P. 619 is derived from MD. ANN. CODE art. 17, § 35 (1951), which had its
origins in Ch. 119. §§ 7 & 8, 1817 Md. Laws 129.
133. See MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. §§3-101 to -503 (1974).
134. But cf. Baxter v. Sewell, 3 Md. 334 (1852) (court cited to then current recording
act). Baxter is discussed in the text accompanying notes 126 & 127 supra.
135. E.g., Balch v. Zentmeyer, 11 G. & J. 267 (Md. 1840); 61 OP. MD. AT'Y GEN. 87,
93-95 (1976).
136. See, e.g., Baxter v. Sewell, 3 Md. 334 (1852).
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record a deed enabled the second transferee to be a purchaser
without notice. 137
RELEVANCE OF THE IDENTITY OF THE PRIOR PURCHASER
TO THE APPLICATION OF THE PRIORITIES PROVISIONS
OF THE RECORDING ACTS TO SHERIFFS' SALES
The problem of the extent to which a purchaser of land at a
sheriffs sale is protected against a prior purchaser of the same land
when the subsequent purchaser records first may arise in one of two
situations. The most common situation is that in which the
controversy is between a purchaser of land on execution sale and a
prior purchaser of the same land from the judgment debtor. In the
second situation, which concerns us here, the dispute is between two
successive purchasers of land on execution sale under the same
judgment.
Regardless of which situation is involved, however, two
propositions are established. First, if the prior purchaser has no
enforceable rights, the subsequent purchaser has priority,138 even if
he has notice of the first purchaser's claim. 139 Thus, in Cockey v.
Milne's Lessee, 40 the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that a
purchaser of land from a sheriff on execution sale, whose deed from
the sheriff was duly executed and recorded, had priority over the
successor in interest to the mortgagee of such land; although this
mortgage was executed, and apparently recorded, prior to the
rendition of the judgment under which the land- was sold by the
sheriff, it was defectively acknowledged and lacked a statutorily
required affidavit. In holding that the execution purchaser had
priority, the court stated:
The law is well settled in this State that the registration of a
deed defectively acknowledged, is not constructive notice to a
137. See, e.g., Busey v. Reese, 38 Md. 264, 269 (1873).
138. E.g., Forsyth v. Brillhart, 216 Md. 437, 140 A.2d 904 (1958) (rights of first
purchaser unenforceable due to failure to comply with Statute of Frauds); Cockey v.
Milne's Lessee, 16 Md. 200 (1860) (rights of first purchaser unenforceable due to lack
of statutorily required affidavit on mortgage under which first purchaser claimed as
successor to mortgagee); Gill v. McAttee, 2 Md. Ch. 255 (1851) (rights of first purchaser
unenforceable due to inability to prove a binding agreement for a mortgage, which
agreement would operate as an equitable lien if proved). But see Caltrider v. Caples,
160 Md. 392, 153 A. 445 (1931) (dictum) (rights of first purchaser, to whom a deed was
executed by the judgment debtor paramount to those of a subsequent judgment
creditor even though the former's contract did not comply with the Statute of Frauds;
in Forsyth, first purchaser never received a deed from contract vendor).
139. Forsyth v. Brillhart, 216 Md. 437, 140 A.2d 904 (1958).
140. 16 Md. 200 (1860).
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subsequent bona fide purchaser, and cannot affect him without
actual notice .... It is unnecessary for us, in this case, to decide
whether a party claiming under an attachment levied upon the
property, is entitled to the same protection as a bona fide
purchaser against a prior deed defectively executed; because we
consider that the want of the affidavit, under the Act of 1846, is
fatal to the validity of the mortgage . . . whether it be assailed
by a creditor or a subsequent bona fide purchaser.41
Similarly, in Forsyth v. Brillhart,142 the Court of Appeals of
Maryland held that a purchaser of land, whose deed was duly
executed and recorded, had priority over the vendee under a prior
contract for the sale of such land, even though the subsequent
purchaser had actual notice of the prior contract when he took title,
because the prior contract was unenforceable due to lack of
compliance with the Statute of Frauds. In support of its conclusion,
the court said:
Notice, actual or constructive, of a contract which is unenforce-
able under the Statute of Frauds, will not prevent the person
having such notice, who purchases the property from the
original owner and receives a transfer of the title, from
obtaining a good title; nor will it render the transaction
fraudulent ... and the fact that the new grantee had notice of
the prior agreement creates no legal objections to the second
.conveyance, for there were no enforceable equities attaching
under the former contract. 143
Consequently, in the situation under discussion, when the controv-
ersy is between two successive purchasers of land on execution sale
under the same judgment, and the first purchase is not evidenced by
any writing sufficient to comply with the requirements of the Statute
of Frauds, the second purchaser necessarily has priority if his own
purchase is evidenced by a writing which complies with the Statute
of Frauds.44
Second, a prior purchaser can have enforceable rights although
he has not recorded, as where the transfer to him, though entitled to
be recorded, is not required to be recorded,' 45 or where the transfer to
him, though required to be recorded, is effective without recording as
141. Id. at 207.
142. 216 Md. 437, 140 A.2d 904 (1958).
143. Id. at 441-42, 140 A.2d at 907.
144. See notes 53 to 55 and accompanying text supra.
145. An example is a contract for the sale of land. E.g., Kingsley v. Makay, 253
Md. 24, 251 A.2d 585 (1969); Westpark, Inc. v. Seaton Land Co., 225 Md. 433, 171 A.2d
736 (1961); Stebbins-Anderson Co. v. Bolton, 208 Md. 183, 117 A.2d 908 (1955).
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between the parties and against those with notice. 146 In these
situations, the prior purchaser can be denied priority against the
subsequent purchaser under a notice-race statute such as that in
effect in Maryland 147 only if the subsequent purchaser is a bona fide
purchaser for value and without notice of the prior transfer who
records his transfer before the prior purchaser records. 148 Thus, if the
subsequent purchaser buys a tract of land at an execution sale
without notice of the prior transfer and records his transfer before
the prior purchaser records, the crucial question is whether a
purchaser at an execution sale can be a bona fide purchaser for
value and without notice. In Maryland, although it appears to be
well settled that a judgment creditor who purchases land on
execution sale under his own judgment cannot be a bona fide
purchaser for value, 149 a purchaser of land on execution sale who is
not the judgment creditor can be a bona fide purchaser for value. 15
Prior to Lewis v. Rippons,'51 every case that considered the
question of whether a purchaser of land on execution sale who re-
cords first is protected against a prior purchaser of the same land in-
volved a controversy between a purchaser on execution sale and a
prior purchaser from the judgment debtor. 52 These cases have held,
146. An example is a conveyance of an interest in land. See cases cited in notes 40
to 42 supra and text accompanying notes 36 to 44 supra.
147. MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. §3-203 (1974).
148. 4 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 4, § 17.5; e.g., Busey v. Reese, 38
Md. 264 (1873); United States Ins. Co. v. Shriver, 3 Md. Ch. 381 (1851), aff'd sub nom.
General Ins. Co. v. United States Ins. Co., 10 Md. 517 (1857); see, e.g., Fertitta v.
Bay Shore Dev. Corp., 252 Md. 393, 250 A.2d 69 (1969); Grayson v. Buffington, 233 Md.
340, 196 A.2d 893 (1964); Tyler v. Abergh, 65 Md. 18, 3 A. 904 (1886); Gill v. Griffith, 2
Md. Ch. 270 (1848).
149. E.g., Kolker v. Gorn, 193 Md. 391, 67 A.2d 258 (1949); Colonial Bldg. & Loan
Ass'n v. Boden, 169 Md. 493, 182 A. 665 (1935); Caltrider v. Caples, 160 Md. 392, 153 A.
445 (1931); Union Trust Co. v. Biggs, 153 Md. 50, 137 A. 509 (1927); Ahern v. White, 39
Md. 409 (1874); Knell v. Green St. Bldg. Ass'n, 34 Md. 67 (1871); cf. Tyler v. Abergh, 65
Md. 18, 3 A. 904 (1886) (holding that an assignee for the benefit of creditors is not a
bona fide purchaser for value entitled to priority as against a prior unrecorded deed).
But cf. Busey v. Reese, 38 Md. 264 (1873) (holding that one who took a deed in
payment and satisfaction of a preexisting debt was a purchaser for a valuable
consideration so that his deed was entitled to priority over a mortgage executed
before, but recorded after, the deed to him was made and recorded).
150. See, e.g., Benson v. Yellott, 76 Md. 159, 24 A. 451 (1892); Spindler v. Atkinson,
3 Md. 409, 56 Am. Dec. 755 (1852); Price v. McDonald, 1 Md. 403, 54 Am. Dec. 657
(1851); Barney v. Patterson's Lessee, 6 H. & J. 182 (Md. 1823). Compare Campbell v.
Lowe, 9 Md. 500, 66 Am. Dec. 339 (1856) with Kolker v. Gorn, 193 Md. 391, 67 A.2d 258
(1949). These cases are discussed in the text accompanying notes 173 to 183 infra.
151. 282 Md. 155, 383 A.2d 676 (1978).
152. E.g., Georgetown v. Smith, 10 F. Cas. 236 (C.C.D.C. 1830) (No. 5,347); Kingsley
v. Makay, 253 Md. 24, 251 A.2d 585 (1969); Stebbins-Anderson Co. v. Bolton, 208 Md.
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almost without exception,153 that a purchaser on execution sale takes
subject to prior unrecorded equities, 54 i.e., he is not entitled to the
benefit of the priorities provisions of the recording acts against a
prior unrecorded equity,'155 even if he records first and has no actual
notice.
As a factual matter, the result in these cases is unexceptionable.
Each of the cases that reached this result involved either an
execution sale to the judgment creditor himself as the purchaser 5 6
or a motion or proceeding in which the judgment creditor was joined,
to prevent the execution sale from taking place, 157 or a proceeding
that was initiated, prior to any execution sale on the creditor's
judgment, to determine, among other things, whether the judgment
creditor had any rights in the land as against the holder of the prior
unrecorded equity. 158 And, because a judgment creditor who
purchases land on execution sale under his own judgment cannot be
a bona fide purchaser for value, 5 9 he clearly is not entitled to the
183, 117 A.2d 908 (1955); Kolker v. Gorn, 193 Md. 391, 67 A.2d 258 (1949); Colonial
Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Boden, 169 Md. 493, 182 A. 665 (1935); Caltrider v. Caples, 160
Md. 392, 153 A. 445 (1931); Union Trust Co. v. Biggs, 153 Md. 50, 137 A. 509 (1927);
Kinsey v. Drury, 146 Md. 227, 126 A. 125 (1924); Cramer v. Roderick, 128 Md. 422, 98
A. 42 (1916); Valentine v. Seiss, 79 Md. 187, 28 A. 892 (1894); Dyson v. Simmons, 48
Md. 207 (1878); Knell v. Green St. Bldg. Ass'n, 34 Md. 67 (1871); Hampson v. Edelen, 2
H. & J. 64, 3 Am. Dec. 530 (Md. 1803).
153. E.g., Campbell v. Lowe, 9 Md. 500, 66 Am. Dec. 339 (1856); discussed in text
accompanying notes 173 to 183 infra.
154. E.g., Georgetown v. Smith, 10 F. Cas. 236 (C.C.D.C. 1830) (No. 5,347); Kingsley
v. Makay, 253 Md. 24, 251 A.2d 585 (1969); Stebbins-Anderson Co. v. Bolton, 208 Md.
183, 117 A.2d 908 (1955); Kolker v. Gorn, 193 Md. 391, 67 A.2d 258 (1949); Colonial
Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Boden, 169 Md. 493, 182 A. 665 (1935); Caltrider v. Caples, 160
Md. 392, 153 A. 445 (1931); Union Trust Co. v. Biggs, 153 Md. 50, 137 A. 509 (1927);
Kinsey v. Drury, 146 Md. 227, 126 A. 125 (1924); Cramer v. Roderick, 128 Md. 422, 98
A. 42 (1916); Valentine v. Seiss, 79 Md. 187, 28 A. 892 (1894); Dyson v. Simmons, 48
Md. 207 (1878); Knell v. Green St. Bldg. Ass'n, 34 Md. 67 (1871); Hampson v. Edelen, 2
H. & J. 64, 3 Am. Dec. 530 (Md. 1803).
155. E.g., Caltrider v. Caples, 160 Md. 392, 153 A. 445 (1931); Knell v. Green St.
Bldg. Ass'n, 34 Md. 67 (1871).
156. E.g., Georgetown v. Smith, 10 F. Cas. 236 (C.C.D.C. 1830) (No. 5,347);
Valentine v. Seiss, 79 Md. 187, 28 A. 892 (1894).
157. E.g., Kolker v. Gorn, 193 Md. 391, 67 A.2d 258 (1949); Caltrider v. Caples, 160
Md. 392, 153 A. 445 (1931); Cramer v. Roderick, 128 Md. 422, 98 A. 42 (1916); Hampson
v. Edelen, 2 H. & J. 64, 3 Am. Dec. 530 (Md. 1803).
158. E.g., Kingsley v. Makay, 253 Md. 24, 251 A.2d 585 (1969); Stebbins-Anderson
Co. v. Bolton, 208 Md. 183, 117 A.2d 908 (1955); Colonial Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Boden,
169 Md. 493, 182 A. 665 (1935); Union Trust Co. v. Biggs, 153 Md. 50, 137 A. 509 (1927);
Kinsey v. Drury, 146 Md. 227, 126 A. 125 (1924); Dyson v. Simmons, 48 Md. 207 (1878);
Knell v. Green St. Bldg. Ass'n, 34 Md. 67 (1871).
159. E.g., Kolker v. Gorn, 193 Md. 391, 67 A.2d 258 (1949); Colonial Bldg. & Loan
Ass'n v. Boden, 169 Md. 493, 182 A. 665 (1935); Caltrider v. Caples, 160 Md. 392, 153 A.
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benefit of the priorities provisions of the recording acts.160 It is
equally clear, however, that the rationale of these cases does not
necessarily apply to the situation in which the purchaser on
execution sale is not the judgment creditor, for such a purchaser can
be a purchaser for value.16 In fact, the one case found that denied
priority to an otherwise enforceable prior unrecorded equity
apparently involved a purchaser on execution sale who was not the
judgment creditor.162
The rationale of these cases, however, cannot be determined
with certainty. Some of the cases state that a purchaser on execution
sale takes subject to prior unrecorded equities because the purchaser
at a sheriffs sale is substituted to the rights of the judgment
creditor. 16 3 In others, the stated rationale is that the purchaser at a
sheriffs sale acquires only the rights of the judgment debtor,164 that
is, only what the judgment debtor himself could have transferred. 65
445 (1931); Union Trust Co. v. Biggs, 153 Md. 50, 137 A. 509 (1927); Ahern v. White, 39
Md. 409 (1874); Knell v. Green St. Bldg. Ass'n, 34 Md. 67 (1871); cf. Tyler v. Abergh, 65
Md. 18, 3 A. 904 (1886) (an assignee for the benefit of creditors is not a bona fide
purchaser for value entitled to priority as against a prior unrecorded deed). But cf.
Busey v. Reese, 38 Md. 264 (1873) (one who took a deed in payment and satisfaction of
a preexisting debt was a purchaser for a valuable consideration; his deed therefore
was entitled to priority over a mortgage executed before, but recorded after, the deed to
him was made and recorded).
160. See note 12 and accompanying text supra.
161. See cases cited in note 150 supra.
162. Campbell v. Lowe, 9 Md. 500, 66 Am. Dec. 339 (1856), discussed in text
accompanying notes 173 to 183 infra.
163. See id.
164. E.g., Hammer v. Westphal, 120 Md. 15, 87 A. 488 (1913); Valentine v. Seiss, 79
Md. 187, 28 A. 892 (1894); Knell v. Green St. Bldg. Ass'n, 34 Md. 67 (1871); see, e.g.,
Lewis v. E.F. Schlichter Co., 137 Md. 217, 112 A. 282 (1920); Manton v. Hoyt, 43 Md.
254 (1875). It also has been frequently stated that the judgment creditor "must stand
or fall by the real, and not by the apparent rights of the defendant in the judgment."
Ahern v. White, 39 Md. 409, 421 (1874); accord, Stebbins-Anderson Co. v. Bolton, 208
Md. 183, 117 A.2d 908 (1955); Kolker v, Gorn, 193 Md. 391, 67 A.2d 258 (1949); Caltrider
v. Caples, 160 Md. 392, 153 A. 445 (1931); Union Trust Co. v. Biggs, 153 Md. 50, 137 A.
509 (1927). Further, it frequently has been stated that the "judgment creditor ...
stands in the place of his debtor, and he can only take the property of his debtor,
subject to the equitable charges to which it was justly liable in the hands of the debtor
.... " Dyson v. Simmons, 48 Md. 207, 215-16 (1878); accord, Kingsley v. Makay, 253
Md. 24, 251 A.2d 585 (1969); Stebbins-Anderson Co. v. Bolton, 208 Md. 183, 117 A.2d
908 (1955); Kolker v. Gorn, 193 Md. 391, 67 A.2d 258 (1949); Kinsey v. Drury, 146 Md.
227, 126 A. 125 (1924); Griffin v. Wilmer, 136 Md. 623, 111 A. 114 (1920); Cramer v.
Roderick, 128 Md. 422, 98 A. 42 (1916).
165. E.g., Maroney v. Boyle, 141 N.Y. 462, 36 N.E. 511 (1894); Hetzel v. Barber, 69
N.Y. 1 (1877); Jackson v. Chamberlain, 8 Wend. 620 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1832); Lessee of
Heister v. Fortner, 2 Binn. 40, 4 Am. Dec. 417 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1809). Fortner was cited
with approval, albeit for a different proposition, in Knell v. Green St. Bldg. Ass'n, 34
Md. 67 (1871).
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In still others, the court has made both statements in support of the
result,166 without regard to the fact that, although these two theories
produce the same result where the purchaser at the execution sale is
the judgment creditor, they cause different results when applied to
the situation in which the purchaser at the execution sale is not the
judgment creditor.
Under the first theory, the purchaser at the execution sale is
substituted to the rights of the judgment creditor. Because he
acquires only the rights of the judgment creditor, who cannot be a
bona fide purchaser for value entitled to the benefit of the priorities
provisions of the recording acts,'167 the purchaser at a sheriff's sale
necessarily will be subordinated to all prior unrecorded equities. This
result obtains even if he is someone other than the judgment creditor
who took title without notice of the prior equities and recorded first.
Application of the second theory, under which the purchaser at
the execution sale is viewed as acquiring the rights of the judgment
debtor, should, however, produce different results, depending on the
identity of the purchaser. This difference is attributable to the fact
that the priorities provisions of the recording acts cause the failure
of the first transferee to record to endow the transferor with the
power to transfer a good title to a subsequent bona fide purchaser
for value and without notice, thereby divesting the title of the first
transferee. 168 Thus, if the purchaser at the execution sale is viewed
as acquiring what the judgment debtor could have transferred, the
purchaser is entitled to the benefit of the priorities provisions of the
recording acts if he takes his title without notice of the prior
unrecorded equities, records first, and is not the judgment creditor.
In these circumstances, he is a bona fide purchaser for value169 and
166. See, e.g., Darraugh v. Preissman, 193 Md. 448, 67 A.2d 262 (1949); Martin v.
Martin, 7 Md. 368, 61 Am. Dec. 364 (1855); Spindler v. Atkinson, 3 Md. 409, 56 Am.
Dec. 755 (1852).
167. E.g., Kolker v. Gorn, 193 Md. 391, 67 A.2d 258 (1949); Colonial Bldg. & Loan
Ass'n v. Boden, 169 Md. 493, 182 A. 665 (1935); Caltrider v. Caples, 160 Md. 392, 153 A.
445 (1931); Union Trust Co. v. Biggs, 153 Md. 50, 137 A. 509 (1927); Ahern v. White, 39
Md. 409 (1874); Knell v. Green St. Bldg. Ass'n, 34 Md. 67 (1871); cf. Tyler v. Abergh, 65
Md. 18, 3 A. 904 (1886) (an assignee for the benefit of creditors is not a bona fide
purchaser for value entitled to priority as against a prior unrecorded deed). But cf.
Busey v. Reese, 38 Md. 264 (1873) (one who took a deed in payment and satisfaction of
a preexisting debt was a purchaser for a valuable consideration so that his deed was
entitled to priority over a mortgage executed before, but recorded after, the deed to him
was made and recorded).
168. See notes 95 & 96 and accompanying text supra.
169. See, e.g., Benson v. Yellott, 76 Md. 159, 24 A. 451 (1892); Spindler v. Atkinson,
3 Md. 409, 56 Am. Dec. 755 (1852); Price v. McDonald, 1 Md. 403, 54 Am. Dec. 657
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without notice. He thus is a person to whom the judgment debtor
himself could have transferred a title good against the prior
unrecorded equities.170 If, on the other hand, the purchaser at the
execution sale is the judgment creditor, he will be subordinated to all
prior unrecorded equities even if he is viewed as acquiring what the
judgment debtor could have transferred. This is because the
judgment debtor's power to divest the title of his first transferee is
exercisable only in favor of a bona fide purchaser for value, 171 which
the judgment creditor is not.17 2
A comparison of Campbell v. Lowe 173 with Kolker v. Gorn174
demonstrates that the purchaser at an execution sale should be
viewed as acquiring what the judgment debtor could have trans-
ferred: the purchaser should be entitled to the benefit of the priorities
provisions of the recording acts if he takes without notice, records
first, and is not the judgment creditor. In Campbell, a judgment was
recovered against William Lowe in 1837. Nine years later, in 1846,
the land in question was conveyed by Reich to William Lowe and his
sister, Urith, as tenants in common. In 1850, the 1837 judgment was
revived. In order to satisfy this judgment, William Lowe's interest in
the land in question was sold at a sheriffs sale to Campbell, who
apparently was not the judgment creditor. 175 Campbell then brought
(1851); Barney v. Patterson's Lessee, 6 H. & J. 182 (Md. 1823). Compare Campbell v.
Lowe, 9 Md. 500, 66 Am. Dec. 339 (1856), with Kolker v. Gorn, 193 Md. 391, 67 A.2d 258
(1949). These cases are discussed in the text accompanying notes 173 to 183 infra.
170. See text accompanying notes 164 & 165 supra. Compare cases cited in note
164 supra with cases cited in note 165 supra.
171. See notes 95 & 96 and accompanying text supra.
172. E.g., Kolker v. Gorn, 193 Md. 391, 67 A.2d 258 (1949); Colonial Bldg. & Loan
Ass'n v. Boden, 169 Md. 493, 182 A. 665 (1935); Caltrider v. Caples, 160 Md. 392, 153 A.
445 (1931); Union Trust Co. v. Biggs, 153 Md. 50, 137 A. 509 (1927); Ahern v. White, 39
Md. 409 (1874); Knell v. Green St. Bldg. Ass'n, 34 Md. 67 (1871); cf. Tyler v. Abergh, 65
Md. 18, 3 A. 904 (1886) (an assignee for the benefit of creditors is not a bona fide
purchaser for value entitled to priority as against a prior unrecorded deed.) But cf.
Busey v. Reese, 38 Md. 264 (1873) (one who took a deed in payment and satisfaction of
a preexisting debt was a purchaser for a valuable consideration so that his deed was
entitled to priority over a mortgage executed before, but recorded after, the deed to him
was made and recorded).
173. 9 Md. 500, 66 Am. Dec. 339 (1856).
174. 193 Md. 391, 67 A.2d 258 (1949). But see Hammer v. Westphal, 120 Md. 15, 87
A. 488 (1913). In holding that the title to land was not rendered unmarketable by the
fact that it was acquired on execution sale, the court in Hammer implied that
transferees of the purchaser on execution sale, as well as the purchaser himself, would
take subject to any prior unrecorded equities that bound the land in the hands of the
judgment debtor.
175. Although the statement of facts in Campbell does not clearly indicate whether
Campbell was the judgment creditor, it appears from the court's discussion of
Campbell in Kolker that the execution purchaser in Campbell was not the judgment
creditor. See 193 Md. at 398, 67 A.2d at 261.
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a proceeding to compel a sale of the land and division of the proceeds.
Urith sought to prove that she was entitled to the entire property, in
contravention of the terms of the deed to herself and her brother. She
alleged that William's interest in the property had been conveyed to
him as mortgagee only, that she had repaid her debt to him, and
that, in 1849, prior to the execution sale, William executed a deed
conveying his entire interest in the property to her. In denying Urith
the right to prove these facts, the court stated:
[Campbell], at a judicial sale, purchased the interest of William
Lowe in this property, in reliance, as we must suppose, upon
Reich's deed to . .. [William] and his sister. [Campbell] was
substituted, by law, to the rights of the judgment creditor, under
whose execution he made the purchase ... and cannot be
affected by the disclaimer of title made by William Lowe, or by
the deed from him to his sister, executed after the judgment
became a lien on the property.. . . If the deed could be reformed,
as between the defendant and William Lowe, or made to operate
differently from the legal import of its terms, to the prejudice of
this appellant, by the introduction of matters in pais, contempo-
raneous with or subsequent to the execution of the instrument,
our registry acts would afford little protection to purchasers.176
In Campbell, the 1846 conveyance of the land to the judgment
debtor was made after the rendition of the judgment under which it
was sold. The case of Kolker v. Gorn177 indicates that, although the
result in Campbell would have been the same if the conveyance to
William and Urith had in fact been made before the rendition of the
judgment against William, it would have been different if the
purchaser on execution sale had been the judgment creditor. In
Kolker, a judgment was obtained against Samuel Gorn in 1948.
Pursuant to this judgment, a writ of fieri facias was levied against
land that had been conveyed to John Gorn, Samuel Gorn and
Samuel's wife, Margaret, in 1941. The language of the deed of
conveyance was held to presumptively create a joint tenancy with
right of survivorship among the three transferees. Both Samuel and
Margaret Gorn sought to quash the writ on the ground that the deed,
176. 9 Md. at 508, 66 Am. Dec. at 341-42 (emphasis added). Had the transfer in
Campbell in fact been made in the form of an absolute conveyance to Urith coupled
with a contemporaneous mortgage thereof executed by her to her brother, William, on
execution sale of the land Campbell could have acquired only William's interest in the
land as mortgagee. See Ahern v. White, 39 Md. 409 (1874).
177. 193 Md. 391, 67 A.2d 258 (1949).
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in reality, conveyed a one-half interest in the land to themselves as
tenants by the entireties and a one-half interest in the land to John
Gorn. In holding that testimony was admissible in this case to show
the true intent of the parties, the court distinguished Campbell,
stating:
In Campbell v. Lowe, ... it was held that parties to a deed
creating a tenancy in common could not vary its terms by proof
of a different intention, as against a purchaser for value at
sheriffs sale under a fi. fa. upon judgment. However, it is well
established that a judgment creditor is not-in the position of a
bona fide purchaser, and his claim is subject to prior, undis-
closed equities. . . It would seem to follow that the wife is not
estopped to show the mistake in the deed, unless by misrepre-
sentation, or otherwise, she induced the creditor to give credit on
the assumption that the record showed the true state of the title
' * We think an execution creditor, who is a stranger to the
transaction and stands in the shoes of the debtor subject to all
outstanding equities, cannot invoke the parol evidence rule to
prevent a party to the deed from showing a mutual mistake by
the parties, in the absence of facts raising an estoppel. 178
If this is so where the prior purchaser acquired his rights from
the judgment debtor, there is even more reason for it to be so where
the prior purchaser acquired his rights on execution sale under the
same judgment as that under which the subsequent purchaser
acquired his rights. 179 In this situation, the record either of the
sheriffs return'80 or of the deed181 evidencing the first sale would
afford constructive notice to a subsequent purchaser from the sheriff.
Only when neither is filed for record can the subsequent purchaser
qualify as one without notice. Failure to file the return for record
must be attributed to the sheriff. On the other hand, failure to ensure
that a deed is recorded, even if the return is not filed, must be
attributed to the first purchaser, who, by such failure, enables the
sheriff to sell the land a second time to one who can claim to take
without notice. As the Court of Appeals has said, "it would be of
178. Id. at 398, 399, 67 A.2d at 261, 262 (citations omitted).
179. See Murguiondo v. Hoover, 72 Md. 9, 18 A. 907 (1889), discussed in note 63
supra.
180. See, e.g., Balch v. Zentmeyer, 11 G. & J. 267 (Md. 1840); 61 OP. MD. ATr'y GEN.
87, 93-95 (1976).
181. See, e.g., Baxter v. Sewell, 3 Md. 334 (1852).
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dangerous consequences to bona fide purchasers, if, after having
paid their money for property sold under competent and legal
authority, they should be at the mercy of officers who might make
imperfect returns of executions, or if they pleased make no returns at
all." 182 In similar situations, the court has remarked that "'when-
ever one of two innocent parties must suffer by the acts of a third
person, the loss ought in Equity to fall upon him who has enabled
the third person to occasion the loss.' "183
EFFECT OF THE LEGISLATIVE ATTEMPT TO
SOLVE THE PROBLEM
In 1972, the Legislature sought to provide a clear statutory
answer to the question of the extent to which the recording acts
apply to sheriffs' sales. The provision that it enacted 8 4 now reads:
If a legal or equitable interest in land is sold under an
execution sale . ..and a deed is executed and delivered to the
purchaser by the sheriff. . . or other officer making the sale, the
grantee in the deed, when recorded, is entitled to the same
protection against the legal or equitable interests of persons not
of record as is provided in this article for the benefit of grantees
in deeds voluntarily executed, delivered and recorded. 8 5
The explanatory comment that accompanied this language
when the provision first was proposed for enactment stated:
Sec. 14-103(a) is a new section which will extend to the
purchaser at an execution sale the same protection against prior
unrecorded conveyances that is afforded a purchaser by
voluntary conveyance from the debtor. Because of the language
in Hammer v. Westphal, 120 Md. 15, pointing out the fact that a
purchaser at an execution sale acquires only the title of the
debtor, the title companies have been unwilling to insure such
182. Estep and Hall's Lessee v. Weems, 6 G. & J. 303, 307 (Md. 1834). Although the
quoted statement was made with respect to the prior purchaser's need for protection, it
applies equally to the subsequent purchaser's need for protection.
183. Busey v. Reese, 38 Md. 264, 269 (1873) (quoting without citation an equitable
platitude), quoted with approval in Hoffman v. Gosnell, 75 Md. 577, 595, 24 A. 28, 32
(1892).
184. Ch. 349, § 1, 1972 Md. Laws 1010, codified as MD. ANN. CODE art. 21,
§ 14-103(a) (Cum. Supp. 1972).
185. MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 14-103(a) (1974), formerly MD. ANN. CODE art.
21, § 14-103(a) (Cum. Supp. 1972).
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purchaser's title on the theory that his rights remain subject to
any unrecorded interest outstanding. 8 6
Unfortunately, however, the extent to which the legislature has
solved the problem, or even changed preexisting law, is debatable. It
is true that the language of the new statute makes it clear that a
sheriffs deed is entitled to be recorded and that, when recorded, it is
entitled to the benefits of the priorities provisions of the recording
act to the same extent as a voluntarily executed recorded deed. This
language, however, does not address itself to the judicially perceived
obstacles to effective application of the priorities provisions of the
recording acts to execution sales.
In the first place, the statute does not in terms solve, or even
refer to, the basic problem of whether a purchaser on execution sale
can be a purchaser for value. A grantee in a recorded deed made by
the owner of land is entitled to protection against a prior unrecorded
conveyance only if he takes for value. Consequently, a purchaser on
execution sale who records his deed from the sheriff likewise can be
entitled to protection against a prior unrecorded conveyance only if
he takes for value. If the statutory language quoted above is not to
be a nullity, it must be construed, at a minimum, as declaratory of
what appears to have been the law prior to its enactment, that is,
that a purchaser on execution sale who is not the judgment creditor
is a purchaser for value who can acquire from the sheriff what the
judgment debtor could have transferred to a bona fide purchaser for
value and without notice. It is doubtful, however, whether this
language will be construed more broadly, as overturning the time-
hallowed rule that a judgment creditor is not a purchaser for value.
The doubt surrounding the interpretation of this statutory
language was not resolved by the court's bald statement in Rippons
that "[w]e take cognizance of Code (1974), § 14-103(a) Real Property
Article, which has no bearing in this case."'18 7 Although it is not
clear why the court found this statute to be inapplicable, the
question whether the "second execution purchaser" took for value
apparently was not a factor. Rather, in light of the facts in the case
and the expressed reasoning of the court, there are only three
possible grounds for the court's finding that the statute was
inapplicable: first, because the "second execution purchaser" took
with ntoice of the rights of the first execution purchaser, 88 or,
186. Comment to the House Bill of Title XIV of the Real Property Article, MD. H.B.
439, at 121 (1972).
187. Lewis v. Rippons, 282 Md. 155, 162 n.2, 383 A.2d 676, 681 n.2 (1978).
188. See note 18 supra.
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second, because the sale occurred before the effective date of the
statute,18 9 both of which reasons would be unexceptionable; and
third, on the dubious theory, not expressly dealt with by section
14-103(a) of the Real Property Article, that after the sheriff sold the
land to the first purchaser, he had nothing more to sell, and thus he
lacked the power to sell the land to the second purchaser.190 The last
alternative lends little support to the court's finding. Even if the
legal title to land sold on execution sale passes to the purchaser by
operation of law' 9' - which is questionable' 92 - it is only a
defeasible title, analogous to an estate on condition subsequent, until
a writing evidencing it is executed and recorded. 93 Thus, so long as
the title of the first execution purchaser remains defeasible, the
sheriff has not sold the entire interest of the judgment debtor in the
land. Rather, he has retained (or, rather, left in the judgment debtor)
a transferable interest, analogous to the right of reentry for
condition broken. 194 This transferable interest can then be sold by
the sheriff on execution sale to another purchaser who, if he takes
for value and without notice, can defeat the title of the prior
purchaser by recording first.195
CONCLUSION
In Lewis v. Rippons,196 the Court of Appeals of Maryland
asserted as dictum that the first of two successive purchasers of the
same land at a sheriffs sale has priority, even if the second
purchaser was a bona fide purchaser for value and without notice
who recorded his deed from the sheriff before the prior transferee
recorded. Analysis of Maryland law has indicated that this assertion
is unfounded. In Maryland, a sheriff is under a duty to execute a
deed of conveyance to the purchaser even if the legal title to land
sold by the sheriff on execution sale is considered to pass to the
189. The effective date of MD. ANN. CODE art. 21, § 14-103(a) (Cum. Supp. 1972),
the predecessor of MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 14-103(a) (1974), was January 1,
1973. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 21, § 15-101 & 15-102(a)(20) (Cum. Supp. 1972).
Because the sheriffs sale in Lewis was held on March 13, 1968, see 282 Md. at 160-61,
383 A.2d at 678-79, it would appear that the statute did not apply.
190. 282 Md. 155, 162-66, 383 A.2d 676, 680-82 (1978).
191. See note 47 and accompanying text supra.
192. See notes 48 to 71 and accompanying text supra.
193. See notes 48 to 71, 91 to 93 and 165 to 167 and accompanying text supra.
194. This right of reentry is transferable. See MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 6-104
(1974).
195. See notes 91 to 93, 165 to 167 and accompanying text supra.
196. 282 Md. 155, 383 A.2d 676 (1978).
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purchaser by operation of law.197 If this deed is duly executed, it is
entitled to be recorded. 198 Consequently, this deed, when recorded, is
subject to, and entitled to the benefits of, the priorities provisions of
the recording acts. 199 Several factors contribute to the conclusion
that the failure of a transferee from the sheriff to record his deed
leaves the judgment debtor with a "reversionary interest" that can
be sold by the sheriff on execution sale to a bona fide purchaser for
value and without notice who records first." First, sheriffs' deeds
are entitled to recordation. Second, a purchaser at a sheriffs sale can
be a purchaser for value, at least if he is not the judgment creditor.
Finally, the priorities provisions of the recording acts render all
transfers made or evidenced by an instrument of a type entitled to
recordation defeasible until recorded in favor of a subsequent bona
fide purchaser for value and without notice who records first.2°1 As
the Florida Supreme Court stated in Emerson v. Emerson,
[A]n unrecorded deed does not, under the law, vest an
absolute estate. Under the recording statutes, the absolute title
rests with the grantor in abeyance, and does not irrevocably
pass to the grantee until the deed is recorded. There is such an
estate left in the grantor as, upon the recording of a subsequent
conveyance to a bona fide purchaser for value without notice,
divests the entire estate passed by the prior unrecorded deed.
2°2
197. See notes 63 to 71 and accompanying text supra.
198. See MD. REAL PROP. CODE ANN. § 14-103(a) (1974); notes 116 to 121 and
accompanying text supra.
199. See notes 74 to 180 and accompanying text supra.
200. See notes 165 to 176 and accompanying text supra.
201. See notes 91 to 93 and accompanying text supra.
202. 17 Fla. 122, 134 (1879).
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